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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a trial de novo in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Utah, reinstating respondent's 
driver's license, which license was suspended following an 
administrative adjudicative proceeding of the Division of Driver 
License Services, Department of Public Safety, (DLS), State of 
Utah. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. 5 
U.S. Const, amend. 14 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-2-130 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-2-131 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-3(l) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) & (ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-ll 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4(5) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the failure of DLS to notify respondent 
personally in writing prior to the administrative adjudicative 
proceeding whether the proceeding was to be conducted formally or 
informally resulted in a denial of due process under Utah law and 
the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
2. Whether the Order of Suspension issued to 
respondent by DLS failed to substantially comply with Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i), so as to deny respondent due process of 
law under determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. 
The Third District Court judgment reinstated the 
driver's license of Verdon C. Brinkerhoff (Brinkerhoff) the 
respondent, following a decision by DLS in an informal 
adjudicative proceeding to suspend Brinkerhoff's driving 
privileges for 90 days for driving under the influence of 
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alcohol. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. S§ 41-2-130 and 41-2-
131, and based upon sworn testimony and official documents, DLS 
and the District Court found that: 
1. The arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that Brinkerhoff was operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, in violation Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44 (T. 64). 
2. Brinkerhoff consented to an intoxilizer test which 
measured his blood alcohol concentration at .10 grams in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (T. 64). 
3. Neither the DUI Summons and Citation/Notice of 
Intent to Suspend or Revoke/Temporary Driver License, nor the 
notice of administrative hearing provided to Brinkerhoff prior to 
the DLS hearing, contained any language that would have informed 
him as to whether the administrative procedure was formal or 
informal in nature. 
4. The order and decision served upon Brinkerhoff 
following the administrative adjudicative proceeding did not 
contain the reasons for decision as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-5(1)(i) & (ii)/ and that said order was conclusary and 
merely stated the language of the applicable statute. 
5. Because of the failure of DLS to comply with the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act in designating 
the hearing as formal or informal and failing to state in the 
order and decision the reasons therefore, respondent was denied 
due process and is entitled to the relief of reinstatement of his 
driving privilege. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On October 26, 1988, Sergeant Ferraro of the South Salt 
Lake City Police Department arrested respondent, Verdon C. 
Brinkerhoff, for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. 
After Brinkerhoff was arrested, Officer Ferraro requested a blood 
alcohol concentration test and gave him the department's standard 
admonition explaining the possible consequences if the result of 
the test was .08 grams or greater (T. 12). Brinkerhoff consented 
and submitted to an intoxilizer test. The results indicated a 
blood alcohol concentration of .105 grams (T. 5-6). 
After the intoxilizer test, Brinkerhoff was given a 
Miranda warning and was asked a few questions about his drinking. 
He was then personally served with a DUI Summons and Citation, 
Notice of Intent to Suspend and Temporary License which notified 
Brinkerhoff in writing of the intent of DLS to suspend his driver 
license for a period of 90 days, which suspension would begin 31 
days from the date of the summons and citation. The summons also 
notified Brinkerhoff of his right to request a hearing before the 
Driver License Division to determine if his license should be 
suspended. (See Addendum A). 
The record shows that Brinkerhoff timely requested a 
hearing before the Driver License Division concerning the 
propriety of the suspension of his license. Counsel for 
Brinkerhoff also requested discovery of all materials intended to 
be used by DLS at the administrative hearing. Those materials 
were provided by the Department, along with a notice of the time 
set for hearing (See Addendum B). A hearing was given with 
testimony being taken, and all relevant documents and evidence 
were before the hearing examiner. (See Addendum C). The hearing 
examiner found the suspension appropriate. A record of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of the hearing officer were 
prepared, which record was made available to respondent upon 
request (See Addendum D). 
At the beginning of the Administrative hearing, counsel 
for respondent asked the hearing officer, Brian Call, whether the 
hearing was being conducted as a formal or informal hearing. The 
hearing officer stated that it was an informal hearing and no 
further objection or motion was made at that time by respondent. 
(See Addendum C at 3). Only after the conclusion of the 
administrative hearing, did counsel for respondent state that the 
action should be dismissed on the grounds that DLS had not 
complied with the Administrative Procedures Act in that no notice 
had been given prior the hearing whether the hearing was to be 
conducted formally or informally. (See Addendum C at 25-26). 
On November 25, 1988, DLS mailed Brinkerhoff an Order 
of Suspension (See Addendum E) indicating that the Brinkerhoff's 
license had been suspended for a period of three months effective 
November 25, 1988, and stating the reasons for the decision. The 
order also indicated that Brinkerhoff had the right to appeal the 
action of the department within 30 days in a court of record. On 
December 2, 1988, Brinkerhoff filed a Verified Petition for 
Judicial Review in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. In addition, Brinkerhoff also filed an ex 
parte motion for stay of the Order of Suspension of DLS pending 
the outcome of the trial de novo in the District Court. The 
motion for stay of the Order of Suspension was granted by Judge 
Moffat on December 5, 1988, and Brinkerhoff's full driving 
privileges were reinstated during the pendency of the judicial 
review. (See Addendum F). Brinkerhoff was then given a trial de 
novo at the District Court level. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The DUI Citation, Notice of Intent to Suspend and 
Notice of Hearing provided to respondent prior to the 
administrative adjudicative hearing, gave respondent actual 
notice of DLS' intent to suspend his license for 90 days for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and notified him of his 
opportunity for a hearing prior to suspension. In addition, the 
promulgation and publication of administrative rules by DLSf 
indicating that its administrative hearings are conducted 
informally under UAPA, gave respondent constructive notice that 
his hearing was to be informal. 
The Order of Suspension sent respondent pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) complied in all material respects 
with the statute by providing the decision, the reasons for the 
decision, notice of any right of administrative or judicial 
review and the time limits for requesting review. Formal 
findings of fact and conclusions were prepared by the hearing 
officer and made available to respondent upon request in writing. 
By failing to request the formal findings and conclusions from 
DLS, respondent should not now be allowed to claim he did not 
have access to them. 
DLS complied with the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act and its own administrative rules in the conduct of 
respondent's administrative hearing in all material respects. 
Pursuant to these procedures, respondent requested and received 
discovery of documents germane to the proceedings and appeared 
and fully participated in the hearing. Participation included 
the opportunity to present any relevant evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses. By participating fully in the administrative 
process and failing to timely request that the proceeding be 
converted to a formal proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-4(3), respondent should now be estopped from asserting his 
due process rights have been violated. 
Procedural due process, under the Utah and United 
States Constitutions, require that a person be given reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to be heard and present any claim or 
defense. Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to be 
heard at the administrative level. In addition, in an effort to 
cure any minor procedural deficiencies, respondent was given a 
trial de novo in the District Court in which he had a full 
opportunity to conduct discovery and present any claim or 
defense. The record fully supports the fact that respondent's 
due process rights were adequately safeguarded and the forms used 
by DLS in its hearing process were adequately clear to provide 
notice of the right to hearing and met due process requirements. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT IN THE CONDUCT 
OF ITS ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l) provides that all 
adjudicative administrative proceedings shall be initiated by a 
notice of agency action if the proceedings are initiated by the 
agency. Subsection (2)(a)(v) further provides that notice of the 
agency action shall include "a statement of whether the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally according 
to the provisions of rules adopted under §§ 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5 
or formally according to the provisions of §§ 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-
11." In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) requires that 
after the close of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing that 
states the decision, the reasons for the decision, a notice of 
any right of administrative or judicial review available and time 
limits for filing an appeal or requesting review. 
Failure to notify whether the hearing was formal of 
informal, and failure to put formal findings of fact and 
conclusions in the subsequent order are the only two areas in 
which Brinkerhoff asserts DLS failed to comply with the 
Administrative Procedures Act. The record supports that these 
are the reasons the District Court determined to reinstate 
Brinkerhoff's license (T. 65-66). 
Section 63-46b-4 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 
allows an agency to designate by rule whether its adjudicative 
proceedings are to be conducted informally or formally, according 
to the procedures established in the act. This section also 
provides that all agency adjudicative proceedings not designated 
as informal by the agency shall be conducted formally. DLS 
promulgated such rules through the rule-making process, held 
public hearings on the rules as required by law, and made them 
generally available to the public. The rules are published in 
the Utah Administrative Code to ensure easy public access and 
allow affected parties to ascertain the contents of the rules. 
The rule-making process and publication of rules are designed to 
communicate to the general public the standards by which the 
agency operates in its administrative hearings. Brinkerhoff had 
easy access to these rules and chose not to avail himself of 
them. (See Addendum G.) 
Rule R712-017-3 of the Utah Driver License Division 
Rules for Administrative Proceedings defines hearing as "an 
informal adjudicative proceeding where evidence is to be taken to 
determine an issue of fact and adjudicate a prior legal right 
based on the division record, evidence, documents and 
information." (See Addendum G p. 1). In addition, Rule R712-
017-6 (see Addendum G. p. 2) designates all adjudicative 
proceedings, except actions mandated by statute, as informal 
unless "converted to formal in the discretion of the presiding 
officer or supervisor." Utah Code Ann. § 63-466-4(3) also allows 
an administrative hearing to be converted from formal to informal 
or informal to formal. Such a conversion of a hearing under the 
statute would not negate the entire proceeding, even if a party 
had been originally notified that the hearing was to be conducted 
in another manner. Obviously notice of whether the hearing was 
to be formal or informal, alone, is not determinative of whether 
the proceeding is fundamentally fair to the affected party. 
The promulgation and publication of the administrative 
rules provided constructive notice of the informal nature of the 
adjudicative proceeding, and substantially complied with the 
clear intent of the statute. If respondent chose not to avail 
himself of the published rules of the Department, he should not 
now be able to assert that he had not received actual notice as 
to the informal nature of the proceeding. Respondent requested 
and received, prior to the hearing, all documents used by Driver 
License Services in the hearing. (See Addendum B.) If he was, 
in reality, unaware of the nature of the proceedings he needed 
merely ask the Department in his request for documents. 
Following the conclusion of the administrative hearing, 
respondent received a signed Order of Suspension indicating the 
decision by the presiding officer of Driver License Services and 
the reasons for the decision. (See Addendum E). The reason for 
the decision was stated in the order as follows; 
The grounds for such action is Utah Code Ann. 
S 41-2-130 and that a peace officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe you had been 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of 
U.C.A. § 41-6-44 (driving under the influence 
law). 
The Administrative Procedures Act in § 63-46^-5(1)(i) requires 
only four items be contained in the signed order. They are as 
follows: (1) the decision (see Addendum &, para. 1), (2) the 
reasons for the decision (see Addendum E£, para. 3), (3) a notice 
of any right of administrative or judicial review available to 
the parties (see Addendum E, para- 7), (4) the time limits for 
filing an appeal or requesting review (see Addendum BT, para. 7). 
The signed order provided to Brinkerhoff contained each of the 
four items listed. Under the statute it need contain no more. 
In the District Court proceedings, Judge Moffat 
determined that the Department's Order of Suspension did not 
comply with the Act in that it stated a legal conclusion of the 
statute rather than setting forth the factual basis of the 
decision. The Court indicated that this factual basis should be 
contained in the order that is mailed to the parties and failure 
to do so results in prejudicial error necessitating reinstatement 
of the driver's license (T. 66). The Court indicated that the 
parties are entitled under the statute to know what the facts 
were upon a decision was based (T. 66). 
Appellant does not deny that a party to an 
administrative hearing is entitled to know the basis upon which 
the decision is reached. However, in driver license suspension 
hearings, the issue is so narrow as to be covered by the 
statement of the reason for decision in the order. The actual 
findings and conclusions of the hearing officer are made a part 
of the administrative record and are available upon request. 
Rule R712-017-9 (Addendum G) requires a presiding officer to make 
a written summary of relevant findings of fact and legal 
conclusions arrived at, along with a brief recommendation. The 
rule further indicates that these findings, conclusions and 
recommendations are to be transmitted to a superior for the 
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preparation of an order, such as was done in this case, and made 
available to the parties upon request in writing. (See R712-017-
9(7) Addendum G). The benefit to a party in requiring DLS to 
mail a copy of this report following each hearing would be 
substantially outweighed by the additional time and cost 
involved. The mere fact that Brinkerhoff chose not to provide 
the Driver License Service with a written request for the 
findings, conclusions and recommendations of the hearing officer, 
should not permit him to maintain that he was unaware of this 
information. Nowhere in the statute is it required that the 
order itself contain these findings of fact and conclusions, but 
only that it contain the four items discussed, supra, pg. 9. 
In discussing adjudicative procedure, Kenneth Culp 
Davis stated: 
the closest approach to a unifying pr*..w*^ -w 
is that courts set aside the administrative 
choice only for clear illegality or for abuse 
of discretion; this principle is applied to 
many problems, including pleadings, 
intervention, place and time of hearings, 
delay, consolidation of proceedings, degree 
of formality and informality, order of 
proceedings and off the record discussions. 
See Davis, Administrative Law Text, (3d ed. 1972 pg. 212) 
(emphasis added). 
In the instant case, there has been no "clear 
illegality" or "abuse of discretion". The DUI Citation and 
Notice of Intent to Suspend (Addendum A) accompanied with the 
notice of hearing (Addendum B p. 3), gave Brinkerhoff notice of 
Driver License Services' intention to suspend his license for 90 
days and notified him of his opportunity for a hearing prior to 
the suspension. The promulgation of administrative rules by DLS 
also gave Brinkerhoff constructive notice of the informal nature 
of the proceedings. See Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323 (1979). 
POINT II 
BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE INFORMAL 
NATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, 
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOW BE ESTOPPED FROM 
ASSERTING THAT THE INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS 
DENIED HIM PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) provides that any time 
before a final order is issued in an adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer may convert an informal proceeding to a formal 
proceeding, if such a conversion would be in the public interest 
and not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. The record 
of the administrative adjudicative hearing clearly indicates that 
counsel for respondent questioned the hearing examiner at the 
beginning of the hearing as to whether the proceeding was being 
conducted formally or informally. (See Addendum C p. 3). Upon 
being notified that the proceeding was informal, the hearing 
proceeded with no further objections. Respondent was able to 
cross-examine witnesses of the department, call his own witnesses 
and present any evidence he felt germane to the proceeding. 
In closing argument at the administrative hearing, 
respondent's counsel stated, "... this per se action should be 
dismissed on the grounds that the division has not complied with 
the Administrative Procedures Act in the following respects. 
First of all, the first time we received notice that this was a 
formal or informal hearing was when Mr. Call himself indicated 
that this was an informal hearing." Respondent however, made no 
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indication of how he was prejudiced from this failure of notice 
or in any way denied an opportunity to discover any relevant 
information or to appear and be fully heard. (See Addendum C 
pgs. 25-26). Had Brinkerhoff been in any way prejudiced by the 
informal nature of the hearing, counsel should have requested the 
hearing officer to allow the proceeding to be converted to a 
formal hearing as allowed pursuant to § 63-46b-4. Respondent, as 
a result of his own in action, should now be estopped from 
claiming he was prejudiced by the proceeding in which he fully 
participated. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized that a 
driver's license is a privilege and not a fundamental right. 
Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323 (1979). Although the privilege is 
constitutionally protected, due process under the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and under 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 only require that a person be given 
notice of intention to terminate the license and an opportunity 
for hearing prior to termination. Smith at 324, 325. The forms 
used by DLS in the instant case were adequate to give notice of 
an intent, to suspend and of the right to a hearing. By 
appearing and fully participating Brinkerhoff obviously had 
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard prior to his 
license being terminated. Such participation should now preclude 
respondent from asserting his due process rights were somehow 
violated. Counsel for Brinkerhoff had a duty to request the 
hearing be conducted formally at the outset. 
DLS has also been informed and believes that counsel 
for respondent had actual notice of the informal nature of the 
proceedings. Respondent's counsel has appeared at other driver 
license suspension hearings which have also been conducted on an 
informal basis. Counsel's actual notice of the nature of the 
proceedings from prior hearings should not allow him to now claim 
DLS failed to notify him of the informal nature of this 
proceeding. 
POINT III 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
REVIEW BY TRIAL DE NOVO THE FINAL ORDER OF 
THE DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
GUARANTEES RESPONDENT REASONABLE NOTICE, 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO PRESENT ANY 
CLAIM OR DEFENSE RELATIVE TO THE PROCEEDING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 allows a person whose license 
has been suspended or revoked by the Division to seek judicial 
review of DLS's final order. The Administrative Procedures Act 
in § 63-46b-15(1)(a) states that "the district court shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from any informal adjudicative proceedings." DLS's 
adjudicative proceedings are informal as provided by 
Administrative Rule R712-017-6. Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-
4(5) provides that the district court has jurisdiction to review 
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in chapter 46b, 
title 63, "and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter 
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings." This includes 
the requirement that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah 
Rules of Evidence be applied. 
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The Utah Code, prior to the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA), provided no uniform procedures for agency 
adjudication and judicial review. Some agency decisions were 
reviewed "on the record" by an appellate court but with various 
standards of review, other agencies were made subject to "on the 
record" review by trial courts and still other agencies received 
de novo review in a trial court. With the adoption of UAPA in 
1987, and numerous amendments enacted in 1988, an attempt was 
made to resolve these disparities. In the overview of UAPA 
written by Allen D. Sullivan, Vice-Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee, the statement is made that one of the purposes of the 
act was to give a "uniform and rational framework for judicial 
review of agency action." (See Addendum H). 
UAPA reflects two principles for the development of a 
uniform system for judicial review of agency action. First, 
agencies that devote sufficient formality, due process protection 
and record building into an administrative adjudication should be 
entitled to deference as to the factual record and findings by a 
reviewing court. An agency that processes a large number of 
cases, on the other hand, at more informal levels of procedure 
with a lower level of due process protection, should be reviewed 
de novo for the protection of the affected party. The number of 
hearings DLS is required to conduct are too numerous to allow a 
formal hearing at the agency level on each one. Therefore, 
judicial review de novo by the District Court assures the 
affected party a fair opportunity to present evidence and be 
heard. 
The Utah Administrative Advisory Committee, responsible 
for drafting the 1988 amendments to UAPA, indicated that the term 
de novo, as used in S 63-46b-15, was to be given its standard 
legal definition. The committee stated in the Comments on the 
Drafting and Interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act as follows: 
The advisory committee considered defining 
but chose not to define the following terms: 
decision; de novo review; hearing and order. 
The advisory committee concluded that these 
terms have an accepted legal meaning in the 
State of Utah and that any ambiguities ought 
to be resolved within the judicial system, 
(emphasis added). (See Addendum H). 
The standard meaning of de novo literally means anew, 
afresh or a second time. Black's Law Dictionary 392 (5th ed. 
1979). In this case, such was the meaning given de novo by Judge 
Moffat. Judge Moffat stated "It is a trial de novo. All new 
evidence comes in and all old evidence comes in; to enable you to 
put it in under the Utah Rules of Evidence even procedure comes 
in. It is truly not an appeal from a prior decision." (T. 62). 
Embodied in the term procedural due process is 
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard and present any 
claim or defense." See In Re Nelson, 437 P.2d 1008 (N.M. 1968) 
and Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The very purpose of 
the two-track system under UAPA is to allow an agency with a 
large number of hearings to hold them at a more informal level, 
with the added requirement that the affected party be given the 
additional protection of de novo review at the District Court. 
While an informal hearing does not allow the same constitutional 
safeguards as a formal hearing, the informal hearing coupled with 
-17-
a trial de novo at the District Court level ensures an individual 
that his due process rights will be protected. Even if we assume 
Brinkerhoff was in some way prejudiced by not being informed in 
the original notice that the administrative hearing was informal, 
a de novo trial in the District Court would have provided a full 
opportunity to conduct discovery and have an opportunity to be 
heard and present any claim or defense. 
The district court should only be allowed to set aside 
the administrative decision for clear illegality, for abuse of 
discretion, or if the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
By setting aside the decision based on a minor procedural 
deficiency the District Court is not providing a trial de novo as 
required by statute, but rather merely reviewing the record of 
the administrative hearing. De novo review allows the District 
Court to cure minor deficiencies at the agency level and provide 
an affected party his day in court. To allow the District Court 
to overturn the Department's ruling, based on a minor procedural 
defect would result in raising technicalities over the merits and 
in effect, do away with the informal hearing process. No longer 
would minor procedural deficiencies at the administrative level 
be able to be cured by a trial de novo in the District Court. All 
administrative hearings would have to be conducted formally, 
requiring huge increases in number of employees and expenses for 
agencies, such as DLS, that handle large numbers of hearings. 
In a per curiam opinion, the United State Supreme Court 
in Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25 (1971), addressed the 
procedural due process afforded a Utah motorist under the Utah 
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Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. The Court affirmed the 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Jennings v. Mahoney, 26 
Utah 2d 128, 485 P.2d 1404 (1971), which held that a review of 
the administrative action based on reports and other evidence 
submitted was not a denial of due process. In citing Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) the United States Supreme Court 
stated that "'before the state may deprive [him] of his driver's 
license and vehicle registration/* the State must provide "a 
forum for the determination of the question" and a "meaningful 
... 'hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Burson at 
541-42. The Court continued as follows: 
There is plainly a substantial question 
whether the Utah statutory scheme on its face 
affords the procedural due process required 
by Bell v. Burson. This case does not, 
however, require that we address that 
question. The District Court in fact 
afforded this appellant such procedural due 
process. That court stayed the Director's 
suspension order pending completion of 
judicial review, and conducted a hearing at 
which defendant was afforded the opportunity 
to present evidence and cross-examine 
witnesses (emphasis added). 
Such is the case in the instant fact situation. 
Brinkerhoff was afforded at least the same due process 
protections as in Jennings. He was given a "forum for the 
determination of the question" and a "meaningful hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case" at the administrative 
level. In addition, the District Court stayed DLS' suspension 
of his license pending completion of judicial review in the 
District Court. The District Court then conducted a de novo 
hearing in which Brinkerhoff was afforded the opportunity to 
present any relevant evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
The forms used by DLS in the conduct of its 
administrative hearing were adequately clear to give notice of 
respondent's right to a hearing and met due process requirements. 
In addition, DLS complied in all material respects with the 
requirements of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act by 
publishing rules detailing the nature of its administrative 
hearings and procedure and issuing a final order after the close 
of the proceeding. Respondent appeared and fully participated in 
the administrative hearing and failed to timely object or request 
conversion of the proceedings from informal to formal. Based 
upon his failure to act, respondent should be estopped from 
asserting he was prejudiced by the informal nature of the 
proceedings. Finally, regardless of the procedure incorporated 
at the administrative level, review by trial de novo in the 
District Court assured respondent a full opportunity to conduct 
discovery, present any relevant evidence and cross-examine 
witnesses. Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully 
requests this court to reverse the District Court reinstatement 
of respondent's drivers license and allow the 90 day suspension 
by DLS to continue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q- day of November, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
LCHARD D. WYSS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
William R. Russell, attorney for respondent, 8 East Broadway, 
Suite 213, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this fc day of 
November, 1989. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
DUI 
SUMMONS AND CITATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
)UNTY OF Q v n vnkC 
ISSUING 
ENFORCEMENT . 
NAME--. (Last) , , (First) 
r TY O F rfHTM o n I M< C 
JAB&RESS r. A (Cuvt v 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
ilVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN 
OF *J,JKlll . 
=0 AT :o>- 1 ^ 7 C 
__
w
. r " ' 5 
i. 'mo iS "^" nx>re man <14> oays after issuance 
:iiaT.c-
CASE 
NO 
CITATION NO 
S i i i i D 20591. 
(Middle) 
TState) 
1 ' - S > ^ 
Empires 
/O 
| State Restriction Code Driver License No j Licenfe Cla: 
IH :W<- ,?7 • VIM 
» rWeight TEyt^ , ^ e x I Vefutie License No I State 
rzip 
' Moiatcyde 
'"Yes No 
Expires 
Vehicle Make I VehicJe Type 1 Vehicle Yea-
: > < ^ ^ 
IColpr JAa iacn ; ; Direct 
/ v ^ f i YesJ No ^ ) 
Direct,on of Trave< 
>4 S E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING 
: UTAH CODE COUNTY CODE I CITY CODE NO.. 
ON THE <-' (r* 
LOCATION 'lA,^ i % 
DAv OP CC !.L££JC 19 1 
' c ZO'JLJ 
/* /- MILITARY TIME 
MILE POST NO 
m?r 
| VIOLATIONS. £//l//sVf 1/siQ-/^- T/ * A^jY'.'- I ' (SI ' • ._• / 
' V,\<f s A - ^ A i _ r J ^ l •C-J-JL-J..^..: .) 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE r . - : ( ' , ^ V. __Jl * > ^ • ^ - " ^ ^ 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER 
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19. U C A 
OFFICER 
COMPLAINANT 
,  ^ I 
SI,CO BADGE NO i ^ VV 
i 1' m</ 
DATE OF CITATION 
PFRSE 
DATE SENT TO DLD •DOCKET NO 
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION i 
VALID OCT 2 81988 
READ CAREFULLY SURR. LIC. 
is citation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent. If an information is 
d you will be provided a copy by the court You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in this citation. 
YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR 
MJR ARREST. 
)TICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE: You are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of 
s notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah will be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-19.6 
/A for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second 
subsequent occurrence of this offense OR if a peace officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a 
emical test to determine the alcohol or drug content of your breath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified 
it thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of 
ah will be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44.10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RE-
JEST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION The hearing is not for purposes of granting you 
imited license but only to determine whether or not your license should be suspended or revoked. 
The department will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing Your WRIT-
:N REQUEST must be sent WITHIN TFN ( im HAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION at 
01 South 2700 West, P.O. Box~30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon your timely written request for a 
aring you will be notified of a time and place to appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license 
spension or revocation will become effective as indicated above. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and 
>es not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court. 
:MPORARY DRIVER LICENSE: This entire information X is VALID as a temporary driver license for a period of 
*•.. / O A \ Mm.*. <»^~s ) k A ^n*ft r\4 •hie r\r\i\n-c% I ' ie M O T V/AI IH ac a tomnnraru Hriwor l i roncp 
ADDENDUM B 
WILLIAM R RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
102 WEST 500 SOUTH SUITE 202 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
(8011 322 5904 
November 1,1988 
Office of Driver License Services 
4501 South 2700 West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0560 
Re: VerDon Brinkerhoff 
D.L. No. 1434579 
D.O.B. 8-5-38 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter is a forma] request for an administrative 
hearing concerning the Notice of Intent to Suspend or Revoke 
issued to the above-named individual on October 28,1988. This 
shall also serve as a formal demand for you to immediately return 
his driver's license to him. 
Please send me a complete copy of all materials which 
you intend to admit into evidence or use in any way at the 
administrative hearing. 
Please notify me of the time and place for the hearing 
requested herein. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Sincere]y, 
W i l l i a m R. R u s s e l l 
c c : VDB 
ROUTING RECORD 
TO 1 OATF - ! - ! *£ -
•iW%' 
Brinkerhoff 
NOAMAN N lAWiRTP. 60VWKW 
. _
 J0tot T
 »"&s». COMMISSIONI* 
0. DOUGLAS I0WEW. DEPUTY COUUlSSlONER 
I . 0AL£ ELTON. OEWTY COMMISSIONER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY 
Pursuant to your request for discovery, please find attached photocopies or 
facsimiles of the following documents which are specific to the hearing 
notification enclosed herein sent to the Department containing the following 
I Y i EHVELCPE 
I Y f DOT C I T A I I C N 
I v I DOT REPORT POEM 
1 x | IHItKILXZER TEST BECOED 
1 1 C71TTFR ^ 
TDese are the only documents on file with this Department at this tiae 
specific to the aforementioned arrest with the exception of the Department of 
Public Safety intoxilyzer test record of the intoxilyzer used (if any) as a 
result of the arrest, ftese documents nay be reviewed at the Driver License 
Office where the bearing istobeheldonthedateofthe hearing. 
«ncamxng cne hearing notification sent to the attorney of record in that 
November A, 1988 
Dated ^ ^ 
3122k 
OWVER UCENSE 0IVISI0N 
Frtd Scfrwtnotman. Oirtctor 
Signature of Department Employee 
4501 Soutfi 2700 West - 3rd Floor Soutft 
P.O. Boi 30560 - Salt Uke Citv. Utah S413M560 
Ttltoftonr 8Q1-96W437 
DOB: 8-5-38 DA: 10-26-88 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
NORMAN H BANGERHR GOVhRNOR 
November 4 , 1988 
JOHN 1 NILLSh N COMMISSION R 
D DOUGLAS BODRfcRO DEPUTE COMMISSION'} R 
Verdon C. Brinkerhoff 
917 Park Row 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84105 
FILE NO.: 
D.O.B.: 
1434579 
8-5-38 
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Under Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, a hearing will be held by this Department 
regarding the items checked below. 
Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Depart-
ment's intention to suspend your driving privileges as a result of your 
arrest for driving under the influence on 
Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Depart-
ment's intention to revoke your driving privileges as a result of your 
arrest for driving underthe influenceand alleged refusal tosubmit to 
a chemical test on 
.you We have received information that on 
were driving while your driving privilege was under revocation/-
suspension. Failure to appear at this hearing ^iay ^ sult ii?exten^ion 
of your revocation or suspttJisjon 
Your hearing has been set as follows: s 
DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
November 21, 1988 o; 
187 North 1000 W. (Fairgrounds) £ '•> £ 4 £ £ ^ f, 
538-8490" City> ^ 'SSaSSSig-S 
2:00 p .m. 
•4-
O 
IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO APPEAR AT THE TIME INDICATED. YOU MUST NOTIFY THE 
OFFICE AT LEAST FIVE (5) DAYS BEFORE THE SCHEDULED TIME. AND UPON 
REASONABLE REQUEST. A NEW HEARING DATE MAY BE SCHEDULED. 
William R. Russel l 
Attorney at Law 
102 W. 500 So. #202 
Salt Lake City , Ut 84101 
Encl: F i l e copy to at tny . 
pbj/114-1 
Very truly yours, 
Phil G. Himmelberger, Bureau Chief 
Driver Services 
. D 
DOB: 8-5-38 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY 
CIT. #: 
CASE*: 
DA: 
D20591 
8813210 
10-26-88 
NORMAN H BANGERTER. GOVERNOR 
November 4, 1988 
JOHN T. NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER 
D. DOUGLAS SODRERO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
Chief Val Bess, For 
Officer Ferraro #L24U 
South Salt Lake Police 
44 East Oakland Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84115 
In reply, please refer to 
FILE NO.: 1434579 
RE: Verdon C. Brinkerhoff 
This Department has received a Report of Arrest for Driving Under the Influence regarding the 
above named individual. It is requested that you appear for a hearing on this matter which has 
been requested by the driver and which has been set as follows: 
DATE: November 21, 1988 
TIME: 2 : 0 ° P-m-
PLACE: 187 North 1000 W. (Fairgrounds) 
Salt Lake City, Ut 
538-8490 
It is important that you appear at this hearing. If you are unable to appear at the time 
indicated, the hearing will be held and action will be taken accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
:c: Chief Val Bess, For 
Officer Lewis 
Officer Mattingly
 Phi, G Himmelberger, Bureau Chief 
South Salt Lake Police Driver Services 
44 East Oakland Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84115 
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ADDENDUM C 
Transcription of Official Tape 
of the Hearing 
November 21, 1988 
H.O.: Bryan W. Call 
Att.: William R. Russell 
Driver: Verdon C. Brinkerhoff 
DL # 1434579 
D.O.B.: August 5, 1938 
H.O.: Today's date is November the 21, 1988. Time set for the 
hearing is 2:00 P.M. It's an administrative suspension hearing 
held for Don C. Brinkerhoff he is present. His date of birth 
is August 5, 1938. Driver license number is 1434579. Mr. 
Brinkerhoff is being represented by William R. Russell. Date 
of the arrest is October the 26, 1988. Location of the hearing 
is Fairgrounds Driver License Office. Hearing Officer is Bryan 
Call. Arresting Officer is Sergeant Ferraro of the South Salt 
Lake City Police Department. Witness Officer, Officer Lewis, 
also of the South Salt Lake City Police Department. This 
hearing is being conducted at the driver's request in 
accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Utah 
Code Annotated 41-2-130, following his arrest for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combination of 
alcohol and drugs. The issues to be determined are: If the 
peace officer had grounds to believe the driver had been in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol and/or drugs, was requested to take a chemical test, 
was warned of the potential consequences of taking the test, 
and test results if any. All formalities required in court 
proceedings need not be used in this hearing. 
However, the Division shall substantially comply with the 
fundamental rules of due process. Sworn testimony will be 
taken and the parties may have witnesses testify. The driver 
may testify and may cross examine others who testify. If the 
license is suspended the driver has the right within 30 days, 
to petition the proper court for an appeal hearing. At this 
time I will swear in those who are going to testify. Both 
Officers will stand. You going to have your client testify? 
Att.: Yes. 
H.O.: Mr. Brinkerhoff will you also stand and raise your right hand? 
Do you each of you swear to tell the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, so help you, God? 
Officer: I do. 
Witness: I do. 
Driver: I do. 
H.O.: Thank you. For the record all have answered affirmatively. 
Sergeant Ferraro could you identify those documents for the 
record, please. 
Officer: This is the DUI report I filled out on Mr. Brinkerhoff on the 
26th of October. 
H.O.: Thank you. The following documents and information are part of 
the records for this hearing. The Officerfs report submitted 
in compliance with Utah Code Annotated 41-2-130. Notice and 
citation served by the officer of the Department's intent to 
suspend, and information on how to receive a hearing by the 
Department. Hearing request made within ten days. Test 
machine record of test results. Operational checklist of test 
instruments. Department of Public Safety affidavit that 
indicates the breath testing instrument was check according to 
Department Standards. Two affidavits being dated October 21st 
and November the 2nd of 1988. At this time Sergeant Ferraro 
would you give us your testimony please. 
Officer: Yes. Ah . . . 
Att.: Excuse me, Mr. Call could I ask if this is being conducted as a 
formal/informal at this time? 
H.O.: As a informal hearing. 
Att.: Informal? 
H.O.: Yes. Okay, Officer. 
Officer: Ah, we were dispatched to an accident about 2695 South 300 
West. That was at ah, 1935 hours on the 26th of October. Ah, 
upon arrival myself and Officer Lewis which were in separate 
vehicles. Officer Lewis handled the accident and during the 
accident investigation it was determined that Mr. Brinkerhoff 
had had some alcohol to drink. Ah, I asked, I handled the DUI 
part of this accident. And we did smell alcohol on the ah, Mr. 
Brinkerhoff's breath and I asked him if he had any alcohol to 
drink, he told me that he had only one beer he also told me 
that he had taken a Valium after work. Ah, I gave him field 
sobriety tests, I gave him five field sobriety tests which he 
was unable to do. At that time I did place him under arrest 
for driving under the Influence of alcohol or drugs. After 
placing him under arrest for that I did transport him to the 
South Salt Lake Police Station where he was read the .08 
admonition. And at that time he did submit to a chemical test. 
He was requested to take a breath test and was given a breath 
test by Officer Warner who was unable to be here today. The 
results of that breath test was a .105. 
Att.: I'll object to that response on the grounds that it is not from 
the Officer'8 observation and ask that it be stricken. 
Officer: I may also add I was present during the breath test and watched 
it being administered. The test was administered by Officer 
Warner who followed the operational check list and the machine 
was found to be functioning correct. 
H.O.: How did you determine that Mr. Brinkerhoff was ah, had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
Officer: Ah, the witness in the, the other party that was involved in 
the accident also he admitted to me that he was driving the 
vehicle. 
H.O.: You said you gave five field sobriety tests, would you please 
tell me what they were and how he performed on those? 
Officer: I gave him, the first test was an alphabet test he said that 
ah, very slow. I requested him to say A through Z. He did A 
through S then stopped and went W through Z. Next test was the 
finger count test I had him count his fingers with his thumb 1 
to 4 then 4 to 1, I asked him to do that test twice. Ah, his 
fingers were shaky and he did not complete that test, he 
couldn't get his fingers in sequence with the numbers. The 
third test was the heel to toe test, I requested him to walk 
nine steps out and nine steps return. His balance was unsteady 
during that test, he stumbled on step 7 out, he stumbled on his 
turn, and he stumbled on returns 3 and 4 steps. The fourth 
test was a finger to nose test ah, during this test his balance 
was unsteady. I requested him to touch his nose with his right 
index finger, he did touch the tip with that. I asked him to 
do his left, he touched under his nose with his left. I asked 
him his left and right again which he did touch the tip at each 
time. The five, number five test was the nystagmus gaze, which 
I noted no smooth pursuit and there was 45 degree and maximum 
deviation eye jerking. 
H.O.: You stated you were present when the breath test was 
administered? 
Officer: Yes. 
H.O.: Do you know if Officer Warner is certified to operate the 
machine? 
Officer: Yes, he is. 
H.O.: And how do you know that? 
Officer: Ah, my certification expired a couple of months ago so I had to 
have him come in and perform the test for me, since he does 
have a current certification. 
H.O.: Counselor would you like to question this Officer? 
Att.: Uh huh. How do you know his is current, his certification, 
Sergeant? 
Officer: Well, in part of the training ah, in the training division 
there's two Sergeants that handle that. And I know because of 
that, that he is current on his certification, that is a 
mandatory thing within our Department that they stay certified. 
Att.: When did he get certified? 
Officer: I don't have the dates with me. 
Att.: When does he, when does the certification run? 
Officer: I don't have the dates with me. 
Att.: But you feel that he is certified at the time of this. 
Officer: Yes, all the Department was certified on the same day. I was 
out of town at the last certification. It was just last year 
that they were certified. 
Att.: Ahem, did you transport Mr. Brinkerhoff from the scene? 
Officer: Yes I did. 
Att.: Okay. Were you an only person, were you in a police cruiser. 
Officer: Yes, I was. 
Att.: Were you the only other person, other than Mr. Brinkerhoff in 
that cruiser? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Ahem, you said that you got a dispatch at 1935 Is that 
stating your testimony correctly Sergeant? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: How did you know that? Ah, I can't find it right here on the 
form except the citation is that where you are getting your 
information? 
Officer: That's the time dispatch gave me that she dispatched this . . 
Att.: Okay. The citation, the military time . . . 
Officer: That would be 7:35. 
Att.: Uh huh. Is that, is that what you are referring to as far as 
your recollection as to the time of dispatch? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Do you have a notation in your report as to when you 
arrived on the scene? 
Officer: Ah, yeah, let me get the accident report here. 1937 see 
(inaudible). 
Att.: Uh hum. Sergeant directing your attention to page two of the 
standarized report form at the very top of that is the field 
sobriety test you referred to. Ahem, on the bottom of that 
section under field sobriety test it says unable to do test. 
Ah, did you mean one test, or all of the tests or what were you 
speaking of specifically there Sergeant? 
Officer: Well, all of his tests he was unable to perform satisfactorily. 
Att.: Officer, you don't mean that he was unable to attempt them, 
just that he didn't do them satisfactorily is that . . . 
Officer: Correct. 
Att.: Okay. Is there any special significance do you use the 
parenthesis that are found in there for any special reason 
Sergeant? 
Officer: Yes. The way I do it is I write down the test I gave and then 
in parenthesis I write what I asked them to do . . . 
Att.: Uh huh. 
Officer: . . .then I put what they did do. 
Att.: Specifically like a 9/9 that would mean that you instructed him 
to do nine up turn around and do nine back. Is that what that 
would mean to you? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: And the parenthesis around the A to Z said do the whole 
alphabet and so forth. 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Ahem, on the finger count you've got 1-4-4-1 twice in 
parenthesis, is that your instructions Sergeant? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. So you did instruct him and did you, did you instruct 
him to do a 1-4-4-1? Finger count? 
Officer: Yes, 1 to 4 and then 4 to 1. 
Att.: Oh. Oh, okay so it's not 1-4-4-1 . . . 
Officer: No. Itfs . . . 
Att.: It's 1-2-3-4 . . . 
Officer: It's 1 to 4 and then 4 to 1. 
Att.: Okay. So you ascend, go up in numbers 1-2-3-4. 
Officer: Right. 
Att.: Then 4-3-2-1 and you instructed him to do that twice is that 
correct? And you demonstrated that to him is that correct? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Is that right? Okay. Ahem, test number four finger to nose 
ah, in the parenthesis again Sergeant it says right, left, 
left, right. And that was both demo, both explained and 
demonstrated in that order is that correct? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: A right two left and then right. 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Now he did hit his tip three out of four times, is that 
right? 
Officer: Yes, sir. 
Att.: And he did follow those instructions as far as the sequence of 
left and right, is that correct? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Ah, Sergeant at the time that you administered the gaze 
nystagmus test to Mr. Brinkerhoff were his glasses on or off? 
Officer: Ah, I had him remove them, his glasses. 
Att.: You had him remove his glasses. 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Where was this test performed Sergeant? 
Officer: I believe they were in the parking lot of the company at 2695 
South 300 West. 
Att.: Uh hum. Where did he put his glasses do you remember? 
Officer: I believe he just held them, to the best of my ability. 
Att.: Okay. 
Officer: My recollection. 
Att.: Okay. Did you have Mr. Brinkerhoff under observation from the 
time you arrived at the scene until the time of the intoxilyzer 
test was given? 
Officer: Well, on and off. Ah, I was giving damage release stickers and 
Att.: Uh huh. 
Officer: stuff like that but . . . 
Att.: Sergeant, specifically in reference to my last question, from 
the time that he entered your police cruiser under arrest, 
until the time that the test was given, were you observing him 
the whole time? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Was he handcuffed at times? 
Officer: Yes, he was. 
Att.: Upon arrest? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. And ah, when you took him in to have the intoxilyzer 
test administered you stated that Officer Warner, was he at the 
station Sergeant? 
Officer: I don't remember whether he was in there or I called him. 
Att.: Okay. Ahem, did you go anywhere after the time that you got to 
the station ah, until Officer Warner administered the test? 
Officer: Ah, yeah, I believe I went into dispatch a couple of times 
after Officer Warner got there and was with Mr. Brinkerhoff. 
Att.: Okay. And how long before the test would that have been last 
time that you went into dispatch? 
Officer: Ah, I don't really remember I was in and out so . . . 
Att.: Let me ask you this ah, . . . 
Officer: (inaudible) was why Officer Warner getting the test prepared I 
was doing a couple of other things like getting his information 
from dispatch and that so . . . 
Att.: You were in another room? 
Officer: Yeah. 
Att.: Okay. Now, I'm sorry Sergeant you are a lot more familiar with 
the South Salt Lake complex than I am. Ah, the court is down 
in the basement, right? 
Officer: The City Hall . . . 
Att.: Yes, uh huh. 
Officer: The Police Station is separate in a separate building. 
Att.: Where is it? Sergeant. 
Officer: It's just west of the main complex. 
Att.: Oh it's just down that little street that runs parallel to the 
freeway. . . 
Officer: Yeah . . . 
Att.: I see. 
Officer: By the tennis courts there . . . 
Att.: Right, by the park. Okay. So ah, dispatch is in a separate 
area from the area, from the area where you keep the 
intoxilyzer machine, is that right? 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. 
Officer: A couple of rooms apart? 
Att.: Alright. Ahem, Sergeant do you recall Mr. Brinkerhoff asking 
you if he could get a drink of water when he got to the 
station? 
Officer: Urn, no I don't recall. 
Att.: You don't recall one way or another whether he did or not? 
Officer: No, no. 
Att.: Ahem, what was Mr. Brinkerhoff's general demeanor Sergeant, was 
he belligerent, combative, ah, aggressive . . . 
Officer: No he was, no he was very cooperative. 
Att.: Did he make any statements to you as to why the police were 
called? To the accident, whether he initiated that call or the 
other driver? 
No. I don't know who called, Officer Lewis can answer that, I 
don't know who was the complainant. 
Alright. Another question about the dispatch Sergeant, sorry 
to skip around so much. You say that you got a dispatch, you 
were dispatched at 1935 military time. 
Officer: Uh hum. 
Att.: Now that is the actual time that your dispatcher radios to you 
that there is an accident, 10:50, right? 
Officer: That's when she gets a call, she stamps a card when the call 
comes in. 
Att.: When she receives the call is the 1935 that we have been 
talking about, is that right? 
Officer: Uh hum. 
Att.: And you, from the accident report have said that you arrived on 
the scene at 1937 military time. 
Officer: 
Att.: 
Officer: Right. 
Att.: Just two minutes between when she, when according to 
procedures she would have received the call and stamped it in 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Just two minutes, okay? Was there anybody in the vehicle with 
Mr. Brinkerhoff? 
Officer: Yes, there was. 
Att.: Could you describe that passenger real briefly? 
H.O.: Counselor, I don't believe that has any pertinence to this 
hearing. 
Att.: He was a witness to the thing. I want to know what statements 
he made. I think it's pertinent. 
H.O.: I don't see that there is any pertinence as to what a passenger 
had to do with this case. 
Att.: As to what another person said, or observed, or what they did? 
H.O.: Do you have any of those witnesses here? 
Att.: No. 
H.O.: Then I don't see any pertinence in going into the involvement 
in the case then. 
Att.: So your telling me I can't ask the question? 
H.O.: Yeah, I won't allow that testimony to be entered on the record. 
Att.: Okay. Sergeant, may I refer your attention to no, excuse me, I 
will withdraw that. Sergeant, do you recall any statement by 
Mr. Brinkerhoff that he had, had an ulcer condition? 
Officer: I don't remember anything about ulcers. He did tell me he had 
a heart and blood pressure problem. 
Att.: Uh hum. 
Officer: Unless, (inaudible) he did have an ulcer I have it written on 
the ah, third page back. At the time I asked him the questions 
he told me he had ulcers also. 
Att.: I see on the interview portion of the ah, . . . 
Officer: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Did ah, you ask him if he had any regurgitation or 
belching problems as a result of his ulcer? 
Officer: No I didn't. 
Att.: Okay. That's all I have. 
H.O.: Okay. Officer Lewis do you want to give us your testimony 
please? 
Witness: Okay, I was dispatched to the scene on an accident. I arrived 
ah, to begin the investigation at 1935. Ah, upon beginning the 
investigation I, standard procedures is to hand out driver 
exchange forms and driver statement forms. Ahem, I requested, 
the vehicles were still out in the 300 West at the time I 
arrived. I instructed the drivers to move the vehicles. Mr. 
Brinkerhoff did move his vehicle into the parking lot at 29, 
correction, 2695 South 300 West parking lot. Ah, while I was 
giving the ah, forms to Mr. Brinkerhoff I did smell an odor of 
alcohol upon his person at the time. Ah, then I proceeded to 
do, begin my investigation of the accident. The only other 
time I had contact with Mr. Brinkerhoff was when he was under 
arrest and sitting in the police car of Sergeant Ferraro. Ah, 
I observed him breathing deep, he looked like he was 
hyperventilating. 
H.O.: I don't have any questions of Officer Lewis, do you counsel? 
Att.: I have nothing. 
H.O.: Okay. Are you going to have your client testify? 
Att.: Yes, I am. 
H.O.: If you want to proceed with that. 
Att.: Just, just a moment I have to think whether I am or not. Can 
I have just one minute with my client? 
H.O.: Sure, we'll go off the record while you step out. 
Att.: Thank you. 
H.O.: We are back on record now. Counsel are you going to have your 
client testify? 
Att.: Yes. He will testify. Would you state your name please? 
Driver: Ah, Verdon C. Brinkerhoff. 
Att.: Uh huh. Don, you've heard the testimony of the two Officers 
about the evening of the 26th of October, haven't you? 
Driver: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. Don would you briefly explain to the hearing examiner 
ah, generally what happened that day? Towards the end of work. 
Driver: Alright. Ah, as I stayed some after work to complete a project 
I was working on. I am also taking a college refresher course 
so I completed my lesson ah, lessons for that course and I also 
completed my monthly bills, I had them in that little red bag 
that . . . 
Att.: What time do you get off work, Don? 
Driver: 4:00 o'clock. 
Att.: And you stayed until when? 
Driver: When I left the area it was ah, little after six, I'd say six 
fifteen or twenty. 
Att.: By the area, what do you mean, Don? 
Driver: I am talking about the Magna ah, . . . 
Att.: Where do you work? 
Driver: 80, 41st West, or 41st South and 8400 West. 
Att.: Did you have plans for that evening Don, and if so what were 
they? 
Driver: Ah, previously I'd plan to meet a fellow by the name of Kimble 
Vance Ett at the Towne and Country. But we normally meet and 
play pool one time a week. 
Att.: What is the location of the Towne and Country, Don? 
Driver: It's 33 South and just off 3rd West, just East of it some. 
Att.: Uh hum. Did you in fact go to the Towne and Country that 
evening, Don? 
Driver: I, I stopped to see if he was still there, yes. 
Att.: Best recollection of when you left your place of employment, 
Don. 
Driver: Oh, twenty after six. 
Att.: Twenty after six P.M. 
Driver: P.M. 
Att.: Uh hum. Your best recollection or estimate as to when you got 
to the Towne and Country. 
Driver: Approximately quarter to seven. 
Att.: Uh hum. Ah, Don did you have anything to drink in the Towne 
and Country? 
Driver: Yes, I did. I ordered, I ordered one beer. 
Att.: Did you drink that? 
Driver: Yes, I did. 
Att.: What was it in a mug, glass, schooner . . . 
Driver: It was in a schooner. 
Att.: Uh huh. 
Driver: (Inaudible) 
Att.: About how tall? 
Driver: Oh I think it is the eight ounce glass. 
Att.: Alright. 
Driver: Whatever that is. 
Att.: Ah, did you have any more beer after that? 
Driver: Ah, thinking back I was talking to a fellow who was sitting 
adjacent to me. He did refill my glass ah, not refill it 
totally but he did have some, he had a pitcher. 
Att.: Uh huh. And how many times did he do that, Don? 
Driver: He did that twice ah, once ah, when we were talking and I went 
to the restroom before leaving and he filled it just before I 
left. 
Att.: Okay. So you canft be exactly sure how many full glasses you 
had to . . . 
Driver: I had . . . 
Att.: With complete precision? What is your best estimate as to how 
many total . . . 
Driver: I, I ordered one and he put, he refilled it and when I say 
refill it was not totally empty at the time. 
Att.: Uh huh. How long do you think you spent in the Towne and 
Country, Don. 
Driver: Ah, maybe 45 minutes or at approximately 7:30 I left . . . 
Att.: Did you have any, . . 
Driver: Within 5 minutes . . . 
Att.: Did you have any hard liquor at that time? 
Driver: No. 
Att.: Okay. Don ah, how was it that you are so conscious about how 
much you drink? 
Driver: I used to be a very heavy drinker and I, in 19 I lost my wife, 
she died. My business ah, through the 1979, 82 time frame I 
was drinking very heavily, mostly at home. 
Att.: When did that stop Don? 
Driver: In the middle of the year 1982, I got a DUI in 1982 
Att.: Uh hum. 
Driver: And for the two years I attended the Utah Alcoholism 
Foundation. Then the . . . 
Att.: Do you limit yourself since then Don? 
Driver: I go out one day a week. 
Att.: Do you go out and drink as much as you want on that day? 
Driver: No, I limit it to two drinks. I never buy more than two drinks. 
Att.: Okay. Don ah, in the testimony of the Sergeants as well as 
reported, it states here that you complained of an ulcer 
problem. What is the extent of the ulcer problem? 
Driver: I have duodenum ulcers, I have peptic ulcers. 
Att.: Does that cause, have any physical manifestations other than 
the discomfort? 
Driver: Yes. 
Att.: What are those. 
Driver: I have severe gas problems when I drink. 
Att.: You mean gas, do you mean like vilification or 
Driver: Yes. 
Att.: You mean ah . . . 
Driver: I belch ah, I'm not supposed to drink at all on an empty 
stomach. 
Att.: Uh huh. Did you have any belching problem that evening? 
Driver: Yes, I did. 
Att.: Ah, when? 
Driver: I think from the ah, time I left the club on. 
Att.: Uh huh. Ah, on the examination, or on the statement of the 
Sergeant that you just heard Don, he stated that there was a 
pause in your A,B,C's . . . 
Driver: Yes. 
Att.: Do you have any explanation for that, Don? 
Driver: Yes. I was belching between the, on the two letters, I said 
them under my breath my (inaudible) was W,X,Z. 
Att.: Don, how long do you figure. First of all let me ask you this, 
do you remember another Officer, not Officer Lewis, not 
Sergeant Ferraro, but another Officer came in and administered 
an intoxilyzer test to you? 
Driver: Yes, I do. 
Att.: Now he isn't either one of these two gentleman here today is he? 
Driver: No. 
Att.: How long was he in your presence Don, by that I mean you could 
see him in the same room? 
Driver: He was there maybe 10 minutes. I'm ah . . . 
Att.: That's fine. Okay. Ahem, Don would you ah, briefly explain 
and skip as much irrelevant detail as you can, just explain to 
the Hearing Examiner what happened when you left the Towne and 
Country Bar. 
Driver: As I was leaving a fellow who later identified himself as a 
Alex Sandaval . . . 
Att.: Uh huh. 
Driver: Asked if he could ride with me, or if I would give him a ride 
to 17th South. That was not my route home, I take the I 80 to 
13th East. But ah, I decided I'd give him a ride. Ah, we left 
directly . . . 
Att.: Was it dark, was it light, was it (inaudible). . . 
Driver: In front of the Towne and Country it was very dark and I had to 
get on to, to get on third West I had to go through pot holes 
and a barricade which were not well lit at all. Ah . . . 
Att.: Do you believe that your head lights were on or off, at that 
time? 
Driver: I know that they were on . . . 
Att.: Okay . . . 
Driver: There is no question. 
Att.: And ah, then you proceeded North on Third West, is that correct? 
Driver: Yes, that's right. 
Att.: Would you describe the incidence leading right up to the 
accident. 
Driver: We drove ah, North on ah, Third West and ah, approximately two 
minutes or less later I was traveling through the 27th South 
intersection. And just as I had gone through the intersection 
a fellow who later I found out that his name was Mr. 
(inaudible) or however it is pronounced, came shooting across 
the curb into the northbound lanes and braked when he saw my 
headlights, when he hit his car. At the same time almost, I 
instantly, I hit my brakes as the skid marks will show, or 
probably ah, evidence. And just before impact in his side door 
which we were sliding towards, I released the brakes slightly 
so I could get some rolling friction. But my front tires and I 
was able to negotiate enough of a turn in the vehicle that our 
vehicles collided. Front at the front passenger side of my car 
and front of the front wheel drivers side of the other car. 
Att.: Do you have any indication that, that person saw your vehicle 
approaching before impact, Don? 
Driver: He wasn't even looking as he came across the curb. He turned 
and stared at us as my headlights lighted up his whole 
vehicle. He had a shocked, stunned look on his face. 
Att.: Uh huh. At any time from the time you left the Towne and 
Country parking lot until the collision happened were you 
headlights off? 
Driver: Not at anytime. 
Att.: Okay. Don, I'm going to ask you what I marked as exhibit A and 
ask if you can identify that please. 
Driver: Yes, this is a sketch I made at the scene ah, ah, approximately 
the positions of the two vehicles as I was going through the 
intersection. Approximately the position I was in when I, the 
front of his car started to immerge ah, across the curb. And 
the final resting position after the front ends of the two 
vehicles had come to ah, stop. 
Att.: Don, did you personally prepare that? I mean make these marks 
and these other indications? 
Driver: Yes, I did. 
Att.: Did you base that upon your recollection? 
Driver: I based that on my recollection and I also went down and 
counted the trees and so on. 
Att.: Uh huh. Did you base this on any other persons recollection? 
Driver: No. 
Att.: So this is made up from, as you just testified, from your, that 
evening plus subsequent observations plus subsequent 
observations . . . 
Driver: Yes. 
Att.: Okay. We offer this as an exhibit on behalf of Mr. Brinkerhoff 
showing the accident area. 
H.O.: Okay. I will accept that in the record. 
Att.: Don, just briefly to clean up, there is obstruction there where 
the vehicle came out . . . 
H.O.: Excuse me, just for clarification, could I have you mark a 
North direction on there so there isn't any question. 
Driver: Let me, excuse me, do that right here now. 
H.O.: Okay. 
Driver: That's North. 
H.O.: Okay. 
Att.: Don ah, for clarification are there any obstructions in the 
area where the vehicle was pulling out of as it relates to your 
line of sight approaching (inaudible) direction? 
Driver: Yes. There were a number of telephone poles. There were some 
small pine trees. There was eight shade trees and one large 
cottonwood tree. In addition there were other cars in that 
parking lot when I pulled in. I couldn't tell you if there 
were any parked in the stalls between the ah, intersection and 
the driveway when the accident occurred, because I was not 
looking in the parking lot at that time. And it was some 
minutes, quite a few minutes later before we pulled in the 
parking lot. 
Att.: Uh huh. When was the first time that this other driver said 
something about your headlights not being on? 
Driver: That was after I refused to move the vehicle, my vehicle along 
with his into the parking lot. 
Att.: You insisted that they stay where they were on the roadway? 
Driver: Stay where they were until the police arrived. 
Att.: Now was that before he went to call the police or after, that 
he made a statement about your headlights? 
Driver: He I, I think he was arguing with Mr. Sandaval about this 
before he went to make the telephone call. He, I had a very 
concoursly conversation. He asked me if we would pull those 
cars in and I said not until the police come. And that was 
about all we had to say to each other. 
Att.: Mr. Brinkerhoff, could you feel the affects of the beer when 
you pulled out of the Towne and Country lot? 
Driver: Not at all. 
Att.: Did you feel the affects of the beer as you were driving up 
third West just before the collision? 
Driver: Not at all. 
Att.: Did you feel the affects of the beer anytime that evening? 
Driver: Yes. 
Att.: When was the first time you felt the affects of the beer? 
Driver: I started to feel affects as ah, ah, as we were finishing the 
forms in the parking lot. About that time. 
Att.: About how long was that after the collision . . . 
Driver: (inaudible) 40 minutes. 
Att.: 30 or 40 minutes. Okay. Ah, Don, do you have an estimate as 
to what your speed was when you cleared the 27th South 
intersection. 
Driver: 35 miles an hour. I looked at my instrument panel just prior 
to ah, ah, entering the intersection. 
Att.: Uh huh. Ah, did you see this vehicle stop Don, the other 
vehicle? 
Driver: It didn't even hesitate. 
Att.: Were it's lights on? 
Driver: I, they weren't when we stopped. He could have turned them 
off. I don't know that. 
Att.: Don, ah, immediately before you took the intoxilyzer test had 
you, did you exchange any belching that you referred to? 
Driver: Yes, and I asked Sergeant Ferraro if I could get a drink of 
water. Aand he said ah, not until after the breath test. And I 
said well that's fair. 
Att.: Okay. 
Driver: I felt a lot of stomach discomfort at the time. 
Att.: Alright. How long does it normally take you to get home from 
the Towne and Country Don, do you have any idea? 
Driver: Yes. Ah, I drove the route afterwards down to the Towne and 
Country from my home and it took 11 minutes. I came back the 
route I would have gone if I would have took Mr. Sandaval and 
dropped him off at 17th South, and that was a little over 15 
minutes. 
Att.: Uh huh. That's all I have. 
H.O.: Do you have any closing statements you would like to make? 
Att.: Yes. The ah, largest and most obvious problem that we have got 
here, first of all is the Baker Rule. Ah, we have no legal 
residual evidence that the Baker Rule was followed. Ah, to the 
contrary, the undisputed testimony on the record is that Mr. 
Brlnkerhoff was in fact suffering from ah, if not regurgitation 
at least some belching at the time, due to his Peptic and 
Duodenal ulcer condition. Ah, we would assert that without the 
showing that the Baker rule was followed ah, that the test is 
inadmissible and cannot be considered as part of the record. 
Ah, further related issue is now evidence ah, that we have 
before us that shows that the Officer who administered the test 
was certified. I understand that Sergeant Ferraro is in charge 
of that. And ah, that he may very well know, but he doesn't 
know the expiration date of the thing. Ah, we don't know if 
the Officer was certified on that night. But, that is a 
subsidiary to the Baker Rule problem that we've got on this 
case. Ah, there is no showing that any person observed Mr. 
Brinkerhoff for the 20 minute continuous period. In fact, the 
uncontrovertid evidence in front of the examiner here today is 
that no one observed him for a continuous 20 minute period 
before that time. My client testified that the observation was 
for a ten minute period ah, that ah, Officer, Sergeant Ferraro 
as his testimony indicates was doing other things at that 
time. We have no showing of Baker Rule. Ah, our primary 
factual contingent is that we've got ah, an intoxilyzer result 
that shows .10. Mr. Brinkerhoff is just a few minutes away 
from consuming his last beer ah, and what we've got here is a 
blood alcohol level. I would ask ah, excuse me I'm not being 
very clear here. We've asked the examiner take judicial notice 
of the Widmark formula. And the ah, little cards that are 
promulgated by this division that show that the ah, time that 
it takes to simulate alcohol into the system is more than a 
period of just five minutes or so. That ah, what we've got 
here is Mr. Brinkerhoff operating a vehicle ah, very safely 
avoiding a complete side slam of this vehicle that comes on to 
the road ah, and nearly avoiding an accident, just bareley 
clipping the front of it. Would indicate that he was not 
intoxicated at that point, due to the response time that he 
nearly avoided the accident completely. And that the other 
driver was at fault. Ah, what we are submitting to this ah, 
this Hearing Examiner is the proposition that Mr. Brinkerhoff 
while he was operating that vehicle was under the .08 limit. 
That the accident was not his fault and therefore he was not 
driving under the influence to a degree which impaired his 
ability to drive safely. After ah, the Officers show up and 
they do the necessary paperwork, and it takes awhile to get the 
information from the drivers. His blood alcohol level was 
climbing during that period and finally exceeded .08, and then 
topped out some about an hour after the collision happened at a 
.10. We submit that there is not a showing that he was not 
under the influence at the time he operated that vehicle. Only 
that it was sometime subsequent that his blood alcohol level 
exceeded the legal Perse limit of .08. Other than the Baker 
Rule the intervening intoxication I do have ah, a couple of 
statements I need to make for the purpose of the record. That 
is that this Perse action should be dismissed on the grounds 
that the Division has not complied with the Administrative 
Procedures Act in the following respects. First of all, the 
first time that we received notice that this was a formal or 
informal hearing was when Mr. Call himself indicated that this 
was an informal hearing. As provided ah, by in section 63-46 
B-3 of the Utah Code any agency action for an Admin, for a 
judicated proceeding must be initiated by a notice which 
contains the following information. Most notably of which is, 
and I will quote from the statute that the ah, judicative 
agency notice must be signed and it says signed, not stamped by 
the presiding Officer of the Division. Ah, the other 
requirements have been met with the exception that under 
(inaudible) 2 A b or 5 ah, there is no statement in the notice 
to whether the injudicated proceeding is to be conducted 
informally according to certain sections, or formally according 
to other sections. Ah, with those two deficiencies ah, we 
believe that the notice is not sufficient under that 
Administrative Procedures Act and therefore, ah, the results 
should be no action by the Division. Also, I didn't say this, 
there is no signature on the notice as well as not indicating 
whether it is formal or informal. On that submit it. 
H.O.: Okay. We will complete the hearing and you will be advised by 
mail as the results of the hearing. 
Att.: Thanks. 
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PRESIDING OFFICERS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
A The peace officer had reason to believe that the driver had / \ ] had not D violated Utah Code Ann 41-6-44 
and was arrested for the same 
B The driver was B was not D placed under arrest for D U I. 
C The driver was IB was not D advised of the possible revocation/suspension of his/her driving privilege 
D The chemical test was fi was not D administered by an officer certified to do so 
E Proper procedures and standards were 3 were not D followed by the peace officer to insure the operation of 
the test machine to be reliable, with the results of % 
F Department of Public Safety affidavit indicated the breath testing instrument used was J$ was not D reliable 
and in proper working order accodnng to Department Standards (UCA 41-6-44 3) 
G. All procedures and requirements were (3 werenot D followed by the reporting officer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
41-2-130. (Explain what procedures were not followed, if any): 
H. Officer did 8 did not D appear. 
Reasons for non-appearance: 
I. Additional findings of fact not covered above: 
CONCLUSIONS: 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO SUSPEND THE DRIVING PRIVILEGE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN 41-2-130 
WERE B WERENOT D PROVIDED IN THIS CASE, AND THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS RENDERED: 
E To suspend the driving Q Take No Action: 
privilege by authority Explain: 
of Utah Code Ann. 41 -2-130. 
Comments by Presiding Officer: 
Presiding Officer: 
FOR CENTRAL OFFICE USE ONLY 
ADDENDUM E 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
10-26-88 
DOB: 08-05-38 
NORMAN M BANGERTER. GOVERNOR JOHN T NIELSEN COMMISSIONER 
0 DOUGLAS BODRERO DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
L DALE ELTON DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
VERDON C BRINKERHOFF 
917 PARK ROW 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84105 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
FILE NUMBER 001434579 
BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR 
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A 
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 25 NOVEMBER 1988. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU 
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF 
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU. 
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-130 AND THAT 
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD 
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.F 
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW). F £ 
u. 
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE r 
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $50.00 FEE FOLLO$IN£ 
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE; 
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $2$*00 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE *; ~ 
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED gOR; 
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. Q i 
ill £ 
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS H^ Lfc 
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUElfTOJB 
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED XT ~ 
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT. £ 4" 
c: * 
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON 1H£ 
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS C | 
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED. £ 
-'- "> •£ 
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YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE 
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS. 
^ ro w. 
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cc: William R. Russell 
Attorney at Law 
102 West 500 South #202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
RESPECTFULLY YOURS, 
^X<i 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, DIRECTOR 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
DI 203 
ADDENDUM F 
COPY FOR YOUR 
HtTpr-^:::! 
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
102 West 500 South, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-5904 
r » 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERDON C. BRINKERHOFF, 
Pet itioner, 
vs, 
FRED C. SCHKENDIMAN,Director, 
and the Office of Driver 
License Services, 
Respondent. 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR 
STAY OF ORDER OF 
SUSPENSION 
Case No. ffgO<?01g?4A A 
The Petitioner, VerDon Brinkcrhoff, by his attorney of 
record William R. Russell, hereby moves this Court, EX PARTE, for 
its Order staying the operation of the Order of Suspension of the 
Petitioner's driving privilege, which was issued by the 
Department of Public Safety, Office of Driver License Services. 
In support thereof, Petitioner respectfully shows this 
Court: 
1. Petitioner has petitioned this Court for judicial 
review, by Trial De Novo, of the Order of Suspension of his 
driving privilege for three months pursuant to Section 41-2-131 
Utah Code Ann. 
2. Unless such stay is granted, operation of the 
Suspension will work immediate, permanent and irreparable harm 
upon the Petitioner as he will be unable to operate a motor 
vehicle to and from his place of employment. 
3. Petitioner has no adequate remedy at law, as 
prospective monetary damages are incalculable. 
4. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court not 
require any security be given by me in that the rights of 
defendants affected by the relief sought arc not so significant 
and/or capable of being quantified that would require that 
security be posted. In addition, defendants will not suffer if 
Petitioner's driving privilege is restored pending judicial 
review. 
This Motion is further supported by the Verified 
Petition filed herein. 
DATED this 2 day of December, 1988. 
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this y day of December, 
1988, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Ex Parte Motion, postage 
prepaid, to 
Mr. Bruce M. Hale, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
14 ItlLJ 
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
102 West 500 South, «202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8-1101 
Telephone: (801) 322-5904 
Ui.C r j / 3 i.7/PBf.ijli' 
P.T ^jMltl-U 
•It \ \ \ 1 CLLKfv 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT COPY FOR YOUR 
INFORMATION SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERDON C. BRINKER1IOFF, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWF.NDIMAN, Director, 
and the Office of Driver 
License Services, 
Respondents. 
STAY OF ORDER OF 
SUSPENSION 
Case No. ffffQ?Q 7^2 H AA 
The Motion of Petitioner, VerDon C. Brinkerhoff, for a 
stay of the operation of the Order of Suspension of his driving 
privileges, issued by the Utah Department of Public Safety, 
Office of Driver License Services, having come before this Court 
Ex Parte for hearing this J day of December, 1988, and the 
Court having reviewed the Verified Petition and other matters 
filed herein, and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
1. That the operation of the Order of Suspension 
issued by the above agency, effective November 25, 1988, relating 
to the driving privileges of the Petitioner, is hereby stayed 
during the pendency of these proceedings. 
2. The Office of Driver License Services is commanded 
to forthwith amend any and all records and/or data relating to 
the driving privileges of the Petitioner to reflect that such 
privilege is in effect, until further order of this Court. 
DATED thjs ^ day of December, 1988 
Certificate of Mailing 
1 >/* 
I hereby certify jthat on this D day of December, 
1988, I mailed a copy or. the foregoing Stay of Order of 
Suspension, postage prepaid,\ to 
Mr. Bruce M. Hale, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
^TATC OF UTAH 
COUNTY Or 3ALT LAKE ) . ! ss 
- - Ti.:r nr^niCT 
DURT 0T SALT LAKC OO'.ruTY. L,"i A!!. V.-O HJ3<nY COCK 
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H. OIXQN HIND 
NORMAN H BANGERTER. GOVERNOR JOHN T NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER 
DOUGLAS BODRERO. OEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
L OALE ELTON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY 
Verdon C. Brinkerhoff 
917 Park Row 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84105 
File No. 
D.O.B. 
1434579 
8-5-38 
Dear driver: 
In compliance with an Order from the Court, your driving privilege 
has been reinstated pending your appeal of an Order of Suspension 
resulting from your arrest for Driving Under the Influence. 
Any further action in this matter will depend upon the disposition 
of your appeal. 
If your driver's license has been received by this department, it 
has been enclosed herein. 
Very truly yours, 
cc: William R. Russell 
Attorney at Law 
102 W. 500 So. #202 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101 
Fred C. Schwendiman 
Bureau Chief 
Driver License Services 
DRIVER LICENSE-DRIVER IMPROVEMENT & CONTROL 
Fred C. Schwendiman. Bureau Chief 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt lake City, Utah 84119 - 965-4437 
ADDENDUM G 
R712-017 OTAH DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
R712-017-1 The short title of this rule shall be Driver License Division, 
Rules for Adainistrative Proceedings. 
R712-017-2 Authority 
The authority for these rules is U.C.A. 41-2-102.5 and 63-46b-l et seq. 
(1988). 
R712-017-3 Definitions 
The following terms and phrases are defined as follows: 
(1) Division - the division is the Driver License Division of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
(2) Division Record - the division record shall consist of its entire 
file including written reports by the department employees and documents or 
exact copies received, including information received by magnetic or 
electronic means or otherwise. It includes minutes, written comments, the 
presiding officer's written statements and summaries of the material, 
testimony, evidence and findings of fact and law, recommendations and orders. 
(3) Hearing - a hearing is an informal adjudicative proceeding where 
evidence is taken to determine an issue of fact and adjudicate a prior legal 
right based on the division record, evidence, documents and information. 
(4) Petition - a petition is a timely, written request for agency 
adjudicative action that is allowed by rule or law. 
(5) Presiding Officer - A presiding officer is a division employee, 
acting under the division director or supervisors with written or unwritten 
responsibilities to conduct adjudicative proceedings and make decisions and 
recommendations. The term "hearing officer11, as used by the division, is a 
presiding officer. 
(6) Recording - a recording is the verbatim magnetic tape recording of 
sworn or unsworn testimony or information and may become part of the 
division records. A division record may be complete without a recording. 
(7) Request - a request is an application to ask the division to take 
action; i.e., issue a driver license and is not a petition (request for 
adjudicative hearing). 
R712-017-4 Purpose and Intent of Rule 
It is intended that these rules not make substantive changes in the law 
but are only guidelines and procedural rules. The purpose is to clarify 
procedures under the Utah Rulemaking Act and the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act as stated in the advisory committees' overview on "Coverage 
of the Act" ("It does not govern the substantive questions with which 
agencies deal.") and "Conments to the Act" taking the federal approach. 
The rule is not intended to extend legal rights, privileges or duties not 
granted or required by Utah law. These rules are intended to facilitate the 
administration of the driver's license statutes contained in Title 4 of the 
Utah Code and to maintain the highest degree of public safety possible. 
These rules do not apply to nonadjudicative actions that are required by 
Utah law. Examples of nonadjudicative actions required by the Utah Code 
are: the initial issuance of a driving permit subject to the statutory 
conditions and requirements to obtain a license contained under U.C.A. 
41-2-103 through 125 (1987). This also includes nonadjudicative actions 
mandated by law based on a receipt of an official record under U.C.A. 
41-2-127, U.C.A. 41-2-601, (the Nonresident Violator Compact), U.C.A. 
41-2-501, (the Driver License Compact) and U.C.A. 41-12a (Financial 
Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act). These examples 
are not all inclusive. 
R712-017-S Petitions for Adjudication 
Fetitions requesting division adjudicative action or responses to notice 
of agency action must be timely filed with the division, must be written, 
clear and concise and include but not limited to the following. 
(1) A clear designation of the parties with any necessary data including 
the date of the prior occurrence or action. 
(2) The reason for the petition. 
(3) The petitioner's full name, address, zip code, telephone number, and 
driver license number or date of birth or division file number. 
(4) The petition must be dated, signed and timely received. The 
department will not proceed on a petition unless the above requirements are 
reasonably met or the division is required to by statute. 
R712-017-6 Designations 
All division adjudicative actions except actions mandated by statute are 
designated to be informal proceedings unless converted to formal in the 
discretion of the presiding officer or supervisor. The presiding officer 
may convert an informal proceeding to a formal proceeding only if approved 
by his supervisor and the conversions will enhance efficiency of the 
proceeding and it will not unreasonably increase costs and it is in the 
interest of public safety. Recordings may be made in adjudicative 
proceedings under U.C.A. 41-2-130, 201, 202, 41-6-44.10, 41-2-12a et seq. 
R712-017-7 Hearings 
Hearings or informal adjudicative proceedings will be held only if 
required by Title 41, Chapters 2, 6, 12(a) of the Utah Code. There must 
also be a timely written petition and a controversy involving a prior valid 
license. 
R712-017-8 Hearing Procedures 
The adjudicative proceedings will be held in the various locations used by 
the division throughout the state at the times and places designated by the 
division director or employees or at a place agreed to by the petitioner and 
the division. The hearings should be open, informative, informal orderly 
proceedings. 
(1) Timeliness. Adjudicative proceedings will only be held if there is a 
timely written petition, request or response. A petition for adjudication 
must be filed within 20 days of the date of the action unless otherwise 
required by statute or division notice or default and the action will be 
entered without further notice. 
(2) Evidence. The parties and witnesses may testify, under oath or 
affirmation, present evidence and cownent only on the pertinent issues. The 
presiding officer has discretion to hear and exclude irrelevant, 
repetitious, innaterial, or privileged information or evidence. The 
presiding officer may consider hearsay evidence. The presiding officer may 
also receive and consider documentary evidence deemed to be reliable 
including copies or excerpts. 
(3) Notice. Notice may be given as provided for ureJer U.C.A. 41-2-122 or 
by other means, telephonic or otherwise agreed to by the parties in order to 
meet the statutory requirements. All notices shall be given on forms 
approved by the department. Approved forms are deemed signed by the 
presiding officer. The notice need only reasonably inform the parties as to 
the date, time, and basic purpose of the hearing. The parties are deemed to 
have knowledge of the law. The division need not state the type of hearing 
as the presiding officer may convert the informal hearing at any time as 
provided under U.C.A. 63-46b-4(5). 
(4) Information. The division may provide information and documents that 
are not confidential and are relevant to the proceedings and issue subpoenas 
for witnesses to be paid for by the requesting party if timely requested and 
providing it will not delay the proceedings. 
(5) Official Notice. The presiding officer has discretion to take 
official notice of the Department of Public Safety's records, procedures, 
rules, policies, technical or scientific facts within his or the agency's 
specialized knowledge or experience or any other facts that could be 
judicially noticed under Utah law. 
(6) Presiding Officer. The presiding officer has discretion to decide on 
the taking of evidence on the relevant issues, administer oaths and 
affirmations, issue subpoenas, rule an offers of proof and the relevancy of 
evidence, take depositions only if the ends of justice would so serve; 
regulate the course of the hearing, hold conferences to encourage 
settlement, clarify the issues, simplify the evidence, facilitate discovery, 
or expedite the proceedings and dispose of all procedural requests or 
similar matters. The presiding officer may limit time periods and control 
the extent of argument and is not subject to the formal rules of evidence as 
the factual and legal issues dictate. 
One presiding officer is not bound by the decision of another presiding 
officer in another proceeding. 
The presiding officer may take "appropriate measures to preserve the 
integrity of the hearing" UCA 63-46(b)-8(2). 
(7) Conment. The presiding officer has discretion to accept written 
conment and expert testimony may be invited. 
(8) Record. The presiding officer may choose to make a verbatim 
recording or record the testimony, information and documents on forms 
provided by the division with "quotations of the verbatim testimony" 
sufficient for court review. 
R712-017-9 Findings, Conclusions, Recomnendations and Order 
The presiding officer should make a brief written sumnary of relevant 
findings of fact and the legal conclusions arrived at with a brief 
recommendation. These recommendations will be final but are open to 
possible review by the director or his designate. Any review will be 
strictly on whether the evidence supports the findings and the law supports 
the conclusions or recommendations. The director will not make choices on 
the believability or integrity of the witnesses. 
(1) Brevity. The findings, conclusions and recommendations should 
briefly state in writing the above reasons and be signed by the presiding 
officer. 
(2) Material Facts - The findings should briefly "summarize" the verbatim 
facts or testimony presented unless it is presented in documentary form. 
(5) Recommendation - The recommendation by the presiding officer for 
agency action may be in the form of check boxes on forms approved by the 
director. 
(4) Findings of Fact and Conclusions - The findings of fact and 
conclusions may be in check box form as approved by the director on forms of 
the division. 
(5) Reasons - The presiding officer may give additional reasons for the 
recomnendation if necessary but only if the reasons are not obvious. 
(6) Transmit - The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the 
presiding officer should be transmitted to a superior as soon as possible 
for preparation of an order. They may be in computerized, handwritten, 
typed or in any form reasonably calculated to facilitate the proceeding arcl 
review. 
(7) Notice to the Petitioner - The division will mail to the petitioner 
written notice of the order to the last known address of the petitioner or 
parties as provided in U.C.A 41-2-122. The written findings, conclusions 
and recocrmendations are available only to the parties and upon request in 
writing. 
R712-017-10 Division Discretion 
The Department of Public Safety and the Driver License Division maintains 
any discretion granted by law or statute and is not limited in its 
discretion by these rules. 
R712-017-11 Exemptions 
These rules do not apply if the director or a presiding officer finds 
imminent peril to public safety health or welfare. 
R712-017-12 Procedural Only 
These rules are subject to change as needed and these rules will be 
periodically reviewed by the division in light of its experience and any 
changes in common or statutory law. They are intended to be procedural only 
and to not to dictate any substantive law. 
R712-017-13 Prior Policies 
These rules adopt the prior actions, procedures, forms, policy statements, 
and rules of the division as they are considered part of the division's 
present policies and procedures that comply or will comply with the intent 
of these rules and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
R712-017-14 Failure to Respond 
If the petitioner fails to timely respond to a departmental request or 
notice, default will be deemed and the division will take the action stated 
in the notice or order or whatever action it deems necessary under the 
circumstances. 
R712-017-15 Ti*e 
The division maintains discretion to shorten or lengthen any time periods 
deemed to be necessary in the interest of public safety or as required or 
permitted by Utah law. This rule is not intended to change any 
jurisdictional statutory time periods. In computing any prescribed time 
period not covered by division rule time periods may be computed in 
accordance with Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
R712-017-16 Knowledge of the Law Presumed 
The division deems that the petitioner has a knowledge of the published 
Utah law and these rules and the division policies and, therefore, need not 
delineate and inform petitioner of all possible issues, basis, or content of 
the Utah Operators License Act. 
R712-017-17 Declaratory Orders 
The division will not issue declaratory orders and any orders or 
reconmendations are not deemed to be declaratory orders unless a declaratory 
statement is deemed necessary by the division director. 
R712-017-18 Stays 
Any division orders issued subsequent to adjudicative proceedings are 
final and will not be stayed by the division or its employees nor will the 
division respond to petitions for stays of final division orders except by 
court order under extraordinary or rare circumstances showing inmediate, 
substantial, irreparable injury and inminent danger to public safety, health 
or welfare. 
R712-017-19 Emergency Proceedings 
The division orders and proceedings, especially those under 41-2-127 to 
130, are not emergency proceedings under U.C.A. 63-46b-20 but complies with 
the statutory mandates of the substantive driver license acts. Notice and 
orders are not emergency even though the time periods may be under 30 days. 
R712-017-20 Construction 
These rules shall be construed to secure a prompt and economical 
detennination of the relevant issues before the division and to comply with 
the general procedural intent and purpose of U.C.A. 63-46b et seq. 
R712-017-21 Severability 
In the event any part of these rules may be held unconstitutional or 
unenforceable the remaining parts are severed and effective. 
KEY: Administrative Proceedings 
1987 
41-2-102.5 
63-46b-l 
ADDENDUM H 
63-46b-l Comments - UALAC 
Comments of the 
Ulih Administrative 
Law Advisory Committee 
on the Drafting and Interpretation of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(Including the 19M Amendment*) 
Using the 1981 version of the Model State Adm-
inistrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) as a guide and 
adapting the MSAPA to Utah's needs, the Utah 
Administrative Law Advisory Committee (Advisory 
Committee) drafted the Utah Administrative Proc-
edures Act (UAPA) The Advisory Committee, 
appointed by Attorney CeneraJ David L Wilkinson, 
consisted of the following members Stephen M 
Hadley. Carl S Hawkins. Dalhn W Jensen. D 
Mark Jones, KayCee McCmley; Stephen F. 
Mecham. Karl N Snow. Jr ; AJan L. Sullivan. A 
Robert Thorup, and Stephen G Wood Mr. 
Hawkins served as chairman and Mr Wood served 
as reporter to the Advisory Committee from April 
1983 until December 1986 In December 1986, Mr. 
Wood was appointed as chairman, Mr Sullivan was 
appointed as vice-chairman and Mr Thorup was 
appointed to direct the lobbying efforts of the 
Advisory Committee on behalf of the UAPA 
The Advisory Committee prepared two sets of 
Committee Comments for the UAPA The original 
set was based on discussions within the Advisory 
Committee and explanations given by the Advisory 
Committee to the Legislature and its committees 
dunng the legislative process in 1987 When the 
UAPA - Senate Bill No 35 before the 1987 
General Session of the Utah Legislature - was 
passed by the House of Representatives on February 
23. 1987, Representative Bishop, the House sponsor, 
moved to reproduce and make available to the 
public the Committee Comments as part of the 
legislative history of the UAPA This motion was 
unanimously adopted See House Journal. Day 43, 
February 23, 1987, at 705 When the Legislature 
unanimously passed the Utah Administrative An 
Amendments - Senate Bill No 86 before the 1988 
General Session of the Utah Legislature - in 1988. 
the Advisory Committee revised the original set of 
Committee Comments to reflect the changes made 
b> this legislation The revised Committee Comm-
ents, like the original Committee Comments, were 
based on discusssions within the Advisory Commi-
ttee and explanations given by the Advisory Com-
mittee to the Legislature and its committees during 
the legislative process The purpose of the Commi-
ttee Comments is to assist all - the public, state 
agencies, the courts and attorneys • who will use 
the UAPA to better understand its provisions 
43-46*-1 Scope and Applicability COMMENTS 
Subject to the exceptions enumerated in Sections 
6 3 - 4 6 b l < 2 ) . 63 46b-1(5) and 63-46b- l (7) . 
Section 63-46b 1(1) states that the UAPA covers 
all adjudicative proceedings conducted by state 
agencies of the State of Utah and judicial review of 
these adjudicative proceedings 
The procedures contained in the UAPA supercede 
existing, conflicting procedures in other statutes In 
this connection, the Legislature required the Advi-
sory Committee to prepare specific repealers of 
existing, conflicting procedures in other statutes. 
Section 63-46b-2(lMt) defines 'adjudicative 
proceeding* to mean *an agency action or procee-
ding described in Section 63-466-1/ See also 
Section 68-3-12 Section 68-3-12 it not a part 
of the UAPA but contains generic definitions and 
rules of construction Section 68-3-i2(2)(a) 
defines 'adjudicative proceeding* to mean *(i) all 
actions by a board, commission, department, 
officer, or other administrative unit of the state that 
determine the legai rights, duties, privileges, immu-
nities, or other legal interests of one or more ident-
ifiable persons, including all actions to grant, deny, 
revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or 
amend an authority, right, or license, and (u) judi-
cial review of all such actions. * 
Section 63-46b-2(l)(b) defines 'agency* to 
include *a board, commission, department officer or 
other administrative unit of this State, including the 
Agency Head, agency employees, or other persons 
acting on behalf of or under the authority of the 
Agency Head* but to exclude 'the Legislature, the 
courts . . . the Governor' and 'any political subdi-
vision of the State or any administrative unit of a 
political subdivision of the State * 
The UAPA does not cover rulemaking See 
Section 63-46b-t(2Xt). The UAPA, however, 
should not be interpreted as discouraging agencies 
from engaging in appropriate rulemaking, particul-
arly rulemaking to elaborate on agency procedure 
consistent with the UAPA. See Section 63-46b-
1(6) Rulemaking is governed by the Administrative 
Rule Making Act rather than the UAPA See Utah 
Code Annotated 63-46a-l et scq 
The UAPA does not cover proceedings that are 
informational or investigative rather than adjudica-
tive The UAPA also docs not cover certain agency 
actions that might otherwise be classified as adjud-
icative proceedings See Sections 63-46b-l(2Mb) 
through 63-46b-!(2Xn) Sections 63-46b-l(2Mb) 
through 63-46b-l(2Kn) axe functional exemptions 
to the UAPA that should be construed narrowly to 
effectuate uniformity in adjudicative proceedings 
The UAPA does not cover 'contracts for the 
purchase or sale of products, real property, supplies, 
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for 
an agency of the state, except as provided in such 
contracts . . . . ' See Section 63-46b-l(2Kg) This 
functional exemption does not exempt leases that 
are the equivalent of a permit or license 
The UAPA does not affect legal remedies other-
wise available to compel an agency to take action or 
to challenge an agency's rules See Section 63-466-
1(3) 
An agency, prior to the beginning of an adjudic-
ative proceeding, or the presiding officer, dunng an 
adjudicative proceeding, is authonzed to request or 
order conferences with parties and interested persons 
to facilitate settlement or streamline the adjudicative 
proceeding See Section 63-46b-l(4) Conseque-
ntly, some of the purposes of such conferences are 
to encourage settlement, to clarify the issues, to 
simplify the evidence, to facilitate discovery, or to 
expedite the proceedings A presiding officer is also 
authonzed to grant a timely motion either to dismiss 
or for summary judgment, if the requirements of 
Rules 12(b) or 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the UAPA axe met The well-developed 
casctaw concerning Rules 12(b) and 56 should assist 
presiding officers in deciding motions made under 
Section 63-46b-1(9) 
Section 63-46©-1(7) has some similanty to the 
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section I-
• Co*i AnnoUUoi Service 10 For Aaooutiots, consult Coo 
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104) The intent of the Committee it that Section 63 
46b lp ) be narrowly construed 
The UAPA is not an aJternative source of juru 
d>ct»on See Section 63-46b-l(8) The approach of 
the UAPA is identical to the federal approach See 
CaJifanov Sanders. 430 U S 90(1977) 
A presiding officer is authorized to lengthen or 
shorten lime periods prescribed by the UAPA for 
food cause See Section 63-46b 1(9) Time 
periods for judicial revie*. howeveT, are not affe 
cted by Section 6 3-46 b 1(9) The Advisory 
Committee, moreover, urges agencies to use the 
authont) contained in Section 63-46b-l(9) span 
nglv to preserve the uniformity of procedure man 
dated by the Legislature 
4J-46b-2 Definitions COMMENTS 
The UAPA contains many terms that require 
definition Many of the definitions chosen were 
borrowed from the MSAPA 
Section 63 46b2(l)(a) of the UAPA and 
Section 68 3 12 which contains general rules of 
statutory construction define 'adjudicative procee 
dings * The MSAPA does not define "adjudicative 
proceedings ' Section 1 102(2) of the MSAPA does 
define 'agency anion • a term that embraces both 
adjudicative proceedings and rulemaking 
Section 63-46b-2(IXb) is patterned after the 
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1 
102(1)) 
Section 63~46b 2(IXc) is identical to the com 
parable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1-
102(3)) 
Section 63-46b20Xe) u identical to the com 
parable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1-
102(4)) 
Section 63-46b 2(1X0 is partially patterned 
after the comparable provisions in the MSAPA 
(Sections 1 102(6) and 1-102(7)) The intent of 
the Advisory Committee is that Section 63-46b 
2(1X0 be broadl) construed 
Section 63-46b 2(1 Kg) is patterned after the 
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1 
102(8)) The intent of the Advisory Committee is 
that Section 63-46b 2( 1 Kg) be broadly construed 
Section 63-46b20Xh) is partially patterned 
after the comparable provision in the MSAPA 
(Section 4 202(a)) Although Section 63-46b 
2(1 Xh) is found in the definitional section of the 
UAPA the provision particularly Sections 63-46b 
2(IXhXw) and 63-46b 2(IXhXn») is not strictly 
definitional but imposes directions to and limitations 
on those persons who can serve as a presiding 
officer See also Section 63-46b 2(2) 
The Advisory Committee considered defining but 
chose not to define the following terms decision, de 
novo rev>r*, hearing and order The Advisory 
Committee concluded that these terms have an acc-
epted legal meaning in the State of Utah and that 
any ambiguities ought to be resolved within the 
judicial system 
45-46b-3 Commencement of Adjudicative 
Proceedings COMMENTS 
Adjudicative proceedings can be commenced 
either by an agency (Section 63-46b-3(IX*)) or by 
a person other than an agency (Section 63-46b-
*0Xb)) 
Section 63-46b 3(2XaX«) is identical to the 
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section 4-
206(cX6)) Sections 63-46b 3(2XaXO and 63-46b-
£(2XaX>x) are patterned after the comparable prov 
i&ions in the MSAPA (Sections 4-206<cXl). 4-
206(c)(2) and 4 206(c)(5)) Sections 63 46b 
3(2)(a)(n). 63-46b 3(2)(a)(vn) and 63 46b 3 
(2XaXxi) have some similarity to the comparable 
provisions in the MSAPA (Sections 4-206(cX3) 4-
206(cX4) 4-206<cX8)and4-2O6<cX7)) 
The agency's role in eliciting the information 
required by Section 63-46b 2(3Xa) and (b) can be 
active as well as passive Section 63-46b 2(3Mc) 
authorizes the agency by rule to prescribe one or 
more printed forms that will serve as the request for 
agency action when completed and filed with the 
agency This same form could provide space and 
guidance consistent with the UAPA for an> resp 
onse due from a person who is required to respond 
to the request for agency action The agencv also 
can provide personnel who will answer questions or 
assist individuals in completing and processing the 
request for agency action 
Nonce normally is given by mail in the case of 
adjudicative proceedings commenced bv a person 
other than the agency Nonce can be given by pub 
lication when required bv statute Compare Sections 
63-46b 3(2XbX")and63-46b 3(3XeKu) 
A written response within 30 davs is normallv 
required for formal adjudicative proceedings See 
Sec t ions 63 46b 3(2) (a) (v i ) and 63 46b 
3(3XeXi"XD) Agencies can facilitate compliance 
with this requirement by designing forms that satisfv 
the requirement Response times shorter than 30 
days are permitted if required b> applicable federal 
law See Section 63-46b 3(5) Response times 
longer than 30 days are permitted on the basis of an 
agency rule See Section 63-46b 3(5) The agenc> 
must provide for a longer response time in advance 
and only for certain designated classes of adjudica 
tive proceedings Normallv no comparable requir 
ement exists for informal adjudicative proceedings 
Compare Sections 63-46b 3(2xaX*i) and 63-46b 
5(IXa) 
The default provisions of the UAPA referred to 
in Section 63-46b-3(2X*Xvii) are found in Section 
63-46b 11 
Commencement of an adjudicative proceeding bv 
a person other than an agency is not a matter of 
right but depends on the existence of a law permit 
ting the initiation of an adjudicative proceeding 
Section 63-46b 3(3XeXmXD) embodies a reas 
onableness standard The notice provision should be 
construed and applied to facilitate notice to persons 
reasonably known to be interested The nonce pro 
vision does not impose a responsibility to locate 
persons whose identit) is unknown or whose I oca 
lion cannot be reasonably discovered 
Some agencies ma> be involved in adjudicative 
proceedings where there are multiple applications 
from competing applicants Section 6^-46b 2(7) 
authorizes agencies in this situation to consolidate 
these multiple competing applications into a single 
comparative adjudicative proceeding 
Section 63 46b 2(4) provides that agencies 
should set by rule the time within which a request 
for agency anion must be filed *ith the agencv in 
cases where initial agency determinations or actions 
are not governed by the UAPA but review of these 
initial agency determinations or actions are governed 
by the UAPA The intent of the Advisory Commi 
nee is that this provision be interpreted as encour 
aging agencies to promulgate such rules The failure 
of an agency to provide a time period normallv 
should be interpreted to mean that the period for 
filing is continuously open in the absence of unusual 
circumstances 
Co«»Co For Annotations consult Cnor aCo*i Annotation Service 11 
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(JJ) any Mctton tali en by an Agency in re-
sponse to committee recommendations, and 
(in) any recommendations by the commit-
toe for legislation its* 
63-46a-ll£. Legislative reauthorization of 
agency rules — Extension of rules by 
governor. 
(1) All grants of rulemaking power from the Legis-
lature to a state agencv in any statute are made sub-
ject to the provisions of this section 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), every 
agency rule that is in effect on January 1 of any 
calendar year expires on May 1 of that year un-
less it has been reauthorized by the Legislature 
during its annual genera) session 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsec-
tion (lKa), an agency's rules do not expire if 
(l) the rule is explicitly mandated by a fed-
eral law or regulation, or 
(n) a provision of Utah's constitution vests 
the agency with specific constitutional au-
thority to regulate 
(3) (a) Prior to January 1 of each year, the Admin-
istrative Rules Review Committee shall have 
omnibus legislation prepared for consideration 
by the Legislature during its annual general ses-
sion 
(b) The omnibus legislation shall be substan-
tially in the following form "All rules of Utah 
state agencies are reauthorized except for the fol-
lowing " 
(c) Before sending the legislation to the gover-
nor for his action, the Administrative Rules Re-
view Committee shall send a letter to the gover-
nor and to the agency explaining specifically why 
the committee believes any rule should not be 
reauthorized 
(4) The Legislature's reauthorization of a rule by 
legislation does not constitute legislative approval of 
the rule, nor is it admissible in any proceeding as 
evidence of legislative intent 
(5) (a) If an agency believes that a rule that has 
not been reauthorized by the Legislature or that 
will be allowed to expire should continue in full 
force and effect and is a rule within their autho-
rized rulemaking power, the agency may seek 
the governor's declaration extending the rule be-
yond the expiration date 
(b) In seeking the extention, the agency shall 
submit a petition to the governor that affirma-
tively states 
(i) that the rule is necessary, and 
(n) a citation to the source of its authonty 
to make the rule 
(c) d) If the governor finds that the necessity 
does exist, and that the agency has the au-
thonty to make the rule, he may declare the 
rule to be extended by publishing that decla-
ration in the Administrative Rules Bulletin 
on or before April 15 of that year 
(n) The declaration shall set forth the rule 
to be extended, the reasons the extention is 
necessary, and a citation to the source of the 
agency's authonty to make the rule 
(d) If the omnibus bill required b> Subsection 
(3) fails to pass both houses of the Legislature, 
the governor may declare all rules to be extended 
by publishing a single declaration in the Admin-
istrative Rules Bulletin on or before April 15 
without meeting requirements of Subsections (b) 
•ad (c).
 tmm 
63-46a-)2. Interested parties. 
(1) An interested person may petition an agency 
requesting the making, amendment, or repeal of a 
rule 
(2) The division shall prescribe by rule the form for 
petitions and the procedure for their submission, con-
sideration, and disposition 
(3) A statement shall accompany the proposed 
rule, or amendment or repeal of a rule, demonstrat-
ing that the proposed action is within the jurisdiction 
of the agency and appropnate to the powers of the 
agency 
(4) Within 30 days after submission of a petition, 
the agency shall either deny the petition in a writing 
stating its reasons for the denial, or initiate rulemak-
ing proceedings in accordance with Section 63-46a-4 
1W7 
63-46a-13. Declaratory judgment to determine 
validity of rule. 
(1) The validity or applicability of a rule may be 
determined in an action for declaratory judgment in 
any distnct court of this state with appropnate 
venue, if it is alleged that the rule, or its potential 
application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens 
to interfere with or impair, the legal nghts or pnvi-
leges of the plaintiff 
(2) In an action for declaratory judgment on a rule, 
the agency shall be made a party to the action 
(3) A declaratory judgment by a court may be ren-
dered whether or not the plaintifT has requested the 
agency to pass upon the applicability of the rule in 
question However, the issue of applicability may not 
be determined by the distnct court while the issue is 
under consideration by the agency dunng any pro-
ceeding pending before that agency or dunng the 
time the agency's decision concerning applicability is 
subject to appeal or being considered on appeal 1985 
63-46a-14. Contesting a rule. 
A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of 
noncompliance with the procedural requirements of 
this chapter shall commence within two years of the 
effective date of the rule i«*5 
63-46a~15. Repealed. lass 
63-46a-16. Utah Administrative Code as official 
compilation of rules. 
The code shall be received in all the courts, and by 
all the judges, public officers, commissions, and de-
partments of the state government as evidence of the 
administrative law of the state of Utah and as an 
authorized compilation of the administrative law of 
Utah is«7 
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lined in Chapter 46a, Title 63. the Uuh Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) If the attorney general issues a written deter-
mination that any provision of this chapter would 
result in the denial of funds or services to an agency 
of the state from the federal government, the applica-
bility of those provisions to that agency shall be sus-
pended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial 
The attorney general shall report the suspension to 
the Legislature at its next session 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to re-
view final agency action 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, 
from lengthening or shortening any time period pre-
scribed in this chapter, except those time periods es-
tablished for judicial review. isss 
63-46b~2. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an 
agency action or proceeding described in Section 
63-46b-l. 
(b) "Agency* means a board, commission, de-
partment, division, officer, council, office, com-
mittee, bureau, or other administrative unit of 
this state, including the agency head, agency em-
ployees, or other persons acting on behalf of or 
under the authority of the agency head, but does 
not mean the Legislature, the courts, the gover-
nor, any political subdivision of the state, or any 
administrative unit of a political subdivision of 
the state. 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body 
of individuals in whom the ultimate legal author-
ity of the agency is vested by statute. 
(d> "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceed-
ing authorized and governed by Section 
63-46b-21. 
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certi-
fication, approval, registration, charter, or simi-
lar form of authorization required by statute. 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person 
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all re-
spondents, all persons permitted by the presiding 
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all per-
sons authorized by statute or agency rule to par-
ticipate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of in-
dividuals, partnership, corporation, association, 
political subdivision or its units, governmental 
subdivision or its units, public or private organi-
zation or entity of any character, or another 
agency. 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency 
head, or an individual or body of individuals 
designated by the agency head, by the 
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compro-
mised, an agency may substitute one presid-
ing officer for another during any proceed-
ing. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding offi-
cer at one phase of a proceeding need not 
continue as presiding officer through all 
phases of a proceeding. 
«) "Respondent" means a person against 
W k k a n a (^u d i c a t i v e proceeding is initiated, 
whether by an agency or any other person. 
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency re-
quired or authorized by law to review the orders 
of another agency. 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from 
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency 
head or the presiding officers with responsibility for 
adjudicative proceedings before the agency lies 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 
63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings shall be com-
menced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedingB are 
commenced by the agency, or 
(b> a request for agency action, if proceedings 
are commenced by persons other than the 
agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and 
served according to the following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in 
writing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall 
include: 
(i> the names and mailing addresses of all 
persons to whom notice is being given by the 
presiding officer, and the name, title, and 
mailing address of any attorney or employee 
who has been designated to appear for the 
agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other ref-
erence number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceed-
ing; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency ac-
tion was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudica-
tive proceeding is to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5. or for-
mally according to the provisions of Sections 
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
formal, a statement that each respondent 
must file a written response within 30 days 
of the mailing date of the notice of agency 
action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
formal, or if a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, a statement of the time and place of 
any scheduled hearing, a statement of the 
purpose for which the hearing is to be held, 
and a statement that a party who fails to 
attend or participate in the hearing may be 
held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be informal and a hearing is required by 
statute or rule, or if a hearing is pernuUed 
by rule and may be requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule, a state-
ment that the parties may request a hearing 
within the time provided by the agency's 
rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative 
proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and 
telephone number of the presiding officer; 
and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adju-
dicative proceeding and, to the extent known 
by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided. 
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cable rule authorizing that designation, 
or formally according to the provisions 
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll, 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudica-
tive proceeding and where respondent 
parties are known, state that a written 
response must be filed within 30 days of 
the date of the agency's notice if mailed 
or within 30 days of the last publication 
date of the agency's notice, if published, 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in 
an informal adjudicative proceeding 
state the time and place of any sched 
uled hearing, the purpose for which the 
heanng is to be held, and that a party 
who fails to attend or participate in a 
scheduled and noticed hearing may be 
held in default, 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be informal, and a heanng is required 
by statute or rule, or if a hearing is per-
mitted by rule and may be requested b> 
a party within the time prescribed by 
rule, state the parties' right to request a 
hearing and the time within which a 
hearing may be requested under the 
agency's rules, and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing ad-
dress, and telephone number of the pre-
siding officer 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions 
are not governed by this chapter, but agency and judi-
cial review of those initial determinations or actions 
are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the re-
quest for agency action seeking review must be filed 
with the agency within the time prescribed by the 
agency's rules 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceed 
mgs, an agencv may, by rule, provide for a longer 
response time than allowed by this section, and ma> 
provide for a shorter response time if required or per-
mitted by applicable federal law 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or 
order, applications for licenses filed under authority 
of Chapters 3, 4, and 5, Title 32A, are not considered 
to be a request for agenc> action under this chapter 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is 
to award a license or other privilege as to which there 
are multiple competing applicants, the agency mav, 
by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative pro-
ceeding to determine the award of that license or 
privilege i*88 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are com 
menced by the agency, the agency shall 
u) mail the notice of agency action to each 
F>art>. 
(u) publish the notice of agency action, if 
required bv statute, and 
(in) mail the notice of agencv action to 
any other person who has a nght to notice 
under statute or rule 
(3) (a) Where the la* applicable to the agencv per-
mits persons other than the agency to initiate 
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request 
for agencv action shall be in writing and signed 
bv the person invoking the jurisdiction of the 
agencv, or b> his representative, and shall in-
clude 
<i) the names and addresses of all persons 
to whom a copv of the request for agency 
action is being sent, 
(u> the agencv s file number or other ref 
erence number, if known, 
(in> the date that the request for agencv 
action was mailed 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which agency action is re-
quested 
(v) a statement of the relief or action 
sought from the agencv, and 
(vi> a statement of the facts and reasons 
forming the basis for relief or agency action 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall 
file the request with the agency and shall send a 
copv b> mail to each person known to have a 
direct interest in the requested agencv action 
(O An agencv may, b> rule, prescribe one or 
more printed forms eliciting the information re-
quired bv Subsection (3><a) to serve as the re-
quest for agency action when completed and filed 
by the person requesting agency action 
(d> The presiding officer shall promptly review 
a request for agency action and shall 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is granted and that the ad 
judicative proceeding is completed, 
(n) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is denied and, if the proceed-
ing is a formal adjudicative proceeding that 
the part> mav request a heanng before the 
agencv to challenge the denial, or 
(in) notify the requesting party that fur-
ther proceedings are required to determine 
the agency's response to the request 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection 
(3>(d>'n> shall contain the information re-
quired by Subsection 63-46b-5<l)(i) in addi-
tion to disclosure required by Subsection 
(3Md)(u) of this section 
(n) The agency shall mail any notice re-
quired by Subsection (3Hd> to all parties, ex 
cept that any notice required by Subsection 
(3)(d>(ui) may be published when publication 
is required by statute 
(in) The notice required by Subsection 
(3><d)<Hi) shall 
(A) give the agency's file number or 
other reference number, 
(B) give the name of the proceeding 
(C) designate whether the proceeding 
is one of a category to be conducted in-
formally according to the provisions of 
rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4 
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceed-
ings as formal or informal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories 
of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted mfor 
mally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not 
violate any procedural requirement imposed bv a 
statute other than this chapter, 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the 
parties to the proceedings will be reasonably pro-
tected b> the informal procedures, 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's sd 
ministrative efficiency will be enhanced by cate-
gorizations, and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceeding* 
outweighs the potential benefits to the public o! 8 
formal adjudicative proceeding 
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(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all 
agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically des-
ignated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules 
shall be conducted formal 1> in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter 
(3) Any t ime before a final order is issued in any 
adjudicative proceeding the presiding officer may 
convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an infor-
mal adjudicative proceeding or an informal adjudica-
tive proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the pub-
lic interest, and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party is«7 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or 
more categories of adjudicative proceedings as infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings the agency shall, by 
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings that include the following 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and 
requires a response no answer or other pleading 
responsive to the allegations contained in the no-
tice of agency action or the request for agency 
action need be fi\ed 
(b) The agency shall hold a h e a n n g if a hear-
ing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing 
is permitted b> rule and is requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule 
(c) In any hearing the parties named in the 
notice of agency action or in the request for 
agency action shall be permitted to testify, 
present evidence, and comment on the issues 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely no-
tice to all parties 
(e) Discovery is prohibited but the agency 
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel 
production of necessary evidence 
(f) All parties shall have access to information 
contained in the agency's files and to all mate-
rials and information gathered in any investiga-
tion, to the extent permitted bv law 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the 
agency may enact rules permitting intervention 
where a federal statute or rule requires that a 
state permit intervention 
(h) All heanngs shall be open to all parties 
d) Within a reasonable time after the close of 
an informal adjudicative proceeding, the presid-
ing officer shall issue a signed order in writing 
that states the following 
d) the decision, 
(n) the reasons for the decision, 
(in) a notice of any nght of administrative 
or judicial review available to the parties, 
and 
dv) the time limits for filing an appeal or 
requesting a review 
(J) The presiding officer's order shall be based 
on the facts appearing in the agency's files and 
on the facts presented m evidence at any hear-
ings 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall 
(2M ? T p t l y m a i l e d to e a Ph o f t h e Parties 
(M A *g e n c y m a y r e c o r d a n y h e a n n g 
f»!!L y Party' a t h l 8 o w n e x D € n 8 e . may have a 
2?n7*jaPProved by the agency prepare a tran-
pl t r o m
 the agency's record of the hearing 
(3) Nothing in this taction restricts or precludes 
any investigative right or power given to an agency 
by another statute isss 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Responsive pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless 
modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), 
the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written 
response signed by the respondent or his representa-
tive within 30 days of the mail ing date or last date of 
publication of the notice of agency action or the notice 
under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference 
number, 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding, 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respon-
dent seeks, 
(d) a statement of the facts, and 
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that 
the relief requested should be granted 
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and 
one copy shall be sent by mail to each party 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, 
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the 
notice of agency action, the request for agency action, 
and the response All papers permitted or required to 
be f\\ed *V>fcU be filed ^w\th the agency and one copy 
shall be sent by mail to each party 1988 
63-46b~7. Procedures for formal adjudicat ive 
proceedings — Discovery and sub-
poenas. 
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency 
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate 
to permit the parties to obtain all relevant informa-
tion necessary to support their claims or defenses If 
the agency does not enact rules under this section, 
the parties may conduct discovery according to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the atten-
dance of witnesses or the production of evidence in 
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the 
presiding officer when requested by any party, or 
may be issued by the presiding officer on his own 
motion 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes 
any investigative n g h t or power given to an agency 
by another statute 1SS7 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicat ive 
proceed ings — Hearing procedure . 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(dKi) 
and (n), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
bearing Bhatt be conducted as foWows 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a 
party, the presiding officer 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrele-
vant, immaterial , or unduly repetitious, 
(u) shall exclude evidence privileged in 
the courts of Utah, 
(in) ma> receive documentary evidence in 
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document, 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts 
that could be judicially noticed under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
other proceedings before the agency, and of 
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technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge 
<c> The presiding officer may not exclude evi-
dence solely because it is hearsay 
(d> The presiding officer shall afford to all par-
ties the opportunity Co present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
<e> The presiding officer may give persons not 
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the oppor-
tunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing 
(D All testimony presented at the hearing, if 
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g> The hearing shall be recorded at the 
agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
person approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script of the hearing, subject to any restrictions 
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose 
to protect confidential information disclosed at 
the hearing 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding of-
ficer from taking appropriate measures necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the hearing. lses 
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, writ-
ten petition to intervene in a Formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to 
intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each 
party. The petition shall include: 
(a i the agency's file number or other reference 
number; 
(b> the name of the proceeding; 
<c> a statement offsets demonstrating that the 
petitioners legal rights or interests are substan-
tially affected by the formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an in-
tervener under any provision of law; and 
id) a statement of the relief that the petitioner 
seeks from the agency. 
(2> The presiding officer shall grant a petition for 
intervention if he determines that: 
<a> the petitioner's legal interests may be sub-
stantially affected by the formal adjudicative 
proceeding, and 
(b> the interests of justice and the orderly and 
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings 
will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to 
intervene shall be in writing and sent by mail to 
the petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may im-
pose conditions on the intervener's participation 
in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary 
for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the ad-
judicative proceeding 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the condi-
tions at any time after the intervention. 1M7 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hear-
ing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the 
time required by any applicable statute or rule of 
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order that includes 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings offset based exclusively on the evi-
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed-
ings or on facts officiary noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the pre-
siding officer's decision; 
(d> a statement of any relief ordered by 
the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon-
sideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative 
or judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved parties, and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any recon-
sideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experi-
ence, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may 
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presid-
ing officer from issuing interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings 
on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and effi-
cient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
1S88 
63*46b~ll. Defaul t 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of de-
fault against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative 
proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly sched-
uled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to file a response under Section 
63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of 
th* grounds for default and shall be mailed to all 
parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the 
agency set aside the default order, and any order 
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent 
to the default order, by following the procedures 
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any 
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding 
officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review 
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration un-
der Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision o(the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun 
by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, an*r 
issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the a*ujr? 
tive proceeding without the participation of U* 
party in default and shall determine all issue* in 
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the adjudicative proceeding, including those af-
fecting the defaulting party 
tV> In art adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the part> in 
default, the presiding officer shall after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding i*w 
63-46b-12. A g e n c y rev iew — Procedure . 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par-
ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 davs after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule 
(b) The request shall 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review, 
(u) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested, 
(in) state the date upon which it was 
mailed, and 
(IV) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each part} 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for review, or within the time period provided 
b> agency rule, whichever is longer, an> party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute 
or rule to receive the response One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agencv, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time required 
by statute or the agency's rules 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
bnefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party 
(c) The order on review shall contain 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review, 
(n) a statement of the issues reviewed, 
(in) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed, 
(v) the reasons for the disposition, 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded, 
(vn) a notice of any right of further ad-
nurastrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties, and 
(vni) the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review \w* 
(if t !3 ir A g e n c v review — Reconsideration. 
, l 1 1 W l t m r> 20 days after the date that an order 
^ued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b 12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
stitute final agency action anv party ma\ file a 
written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested 
(b) Unless otherwise provided bv statute the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek 
ing judicial review of the order 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent b> mail to 
each party by the person making the request 
(3) (a» The agency head or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de-
nied 1968 
63-46b-14. Judic ia l review — Exhaus t ion of ad-
ministrative remedies 
(DA party aggrieved mav obtain judicial review of 
final agency action except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited bv statute 
(2) A part\ ma\ seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that 
(a) 8 party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required, 
(b) the court may relieve a part) seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust anv or 
all administrative remedieb if 
(I) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate, or 
(n) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex 
haustion 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 davs after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13*3Mb) 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter issa 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
<\\ <a\ The d\atuct court* *h&U have 5unsd\cUos\ to 
review b> trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
partv seeking judicial review, 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency. 
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(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
dv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ing* that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
<vii> a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
<3> (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section 1988 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b> The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3> The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court), except that: 
(a> all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcript* and copies for the record 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record, or 
(n) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following. 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as B decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
1968 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action, or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in deny-
ing the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely 
to prevail on the merits when the court 
finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings; and 
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(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
•u/Ticiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances 1W7 
«3-46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by 
law. an agency may seek enforcement of an order 
by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order must name, as defendants, each 
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks 
to obtain civil enforcement. 
(c> Venue for an action seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by 
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 
<d> The action may request, and the court may 
grant, any of the following: 
(i) declaratory relief, 
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive re-
lief, 
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by 
law; or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing 
(2) (a> Any person whose interests are directly im-
paired or threatened by the failure of an agency 
to enforce an agency's order may timely file a 
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that or-
der, but the action may not be commenced 
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff 
has given notice of his intent to seek civil 
enforcement of the alleged violation to the 
agency head, the attorney general, and to 
each alleged violator against whom the peti-
tioner seeks civil enforcement; 
(ii) if the agency has filed and is dil igently 
prosecuting a complaint seeking civil en-
forcement of the same order against the 
same or a similarly situated defendant, or 
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the 
same order has been filed and is pending in 
court. 
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of 
an agency's order must name, as defendants, the 
agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the 
agency that is vested with the power to enforce 
the order, and each alleged violator against 
whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement. 
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized 
by statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement 
of an agency's order may not request, and the 
court may not grant, any monetary' payment 
apart from taxable costs. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an 
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses al-
lowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground 
that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued 
by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the 
order, 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant; 
\CJ ^ e ^ e f e n d a n t nAS n o t violated the order; or 
to) the defendant violated the order but has 
wwequently complied, 
m* t y 0 1 8 1 0 1 1 8 o n complaints seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order are reviewable in the same 
manner as other civil cases. imi 
*>-*6b-20. E m e r g e n c y a d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d -
tags. 
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency 
basis without complying with the requirement* of 
this chapter if 
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented 
to the agency show that an immediate and signif-
icant danger to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare exists; and 
(b) the threat requires immediate action by 
the agency. 
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency 
shall: 
(a) l imit i ts order to require only the action 
necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to the 
public health, safety, or welfare; 
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective 
immediately , that includes a brief s tatement of 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons 
for the agency's utilization of emergency adjudi-
cative proceedings; and 
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who 
are required to comply with the order. 
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section 
will result in the continued infringement or impair-
ment of any legal right or interest of any party, the 
agency shall commence a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding in accordance with the other provisions of 
this chapter. 1967 
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
(1) Any person may file a request for agency ac-
tion, requesting that the agency issue a declaratory 
order determining the applicability of a statute , rule, 
or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency 
to specified circumstances. 
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that: 
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of 
petit ions for declaratory orders; 
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions; 
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which 
the agency will not issue a declaratory order; 
(d> are consistent with the public interest and 
with the general policy of this chapter; and 
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of 
reliable advice. 
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory or-
der if: 
(i) the request is one of a class of circum-
stances that the agency has by rule defined 
as being exempt from declaratory orders; or 
(ii) the person requesting the declaratory 
order participated in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding concerning the same issue within 12 
months of the date of the present request, 
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order 
that would substantial ly prejudice the rights of a 
person who would be a necessary party, only if 
that person consents in writ ing to the determina-
tion of the matter by 8 declaratory proceeding 
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceed-
ings if: 
(a) they meet the requirements of Section 
63-46b-9; and 
(b) they file t imely petit ions for intervention 
according to agency rules. 
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that 
other provisions of Sections 63-46b-4 through 
63-46b-13 apply to declaratory proceedings 
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory-
order, the agency may issue a written order: 
(i) declaring the applicability of the stat-
ute, rule, or order in question to the specified 
circumstances; 
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(ii) setting the matter for adjudicative pro-
ceedings, 
(in> agreeing to issue a declaratory order 
within a specified time, or 
(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order 
and stating the reasons for its action. 
(b) A declaratory order shall contain: 
(i) the names of all parties to the proceed-
ing on which it is based; 
(ii) the particular facts on which it is 
based, and 
(in) the reasons for its conclusion. 
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a 
request for a declaratory proceeding shall be 
mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other 
parties 
(d) A declaratory order has the same status 
and binding effect as any other order issued in an 
adjudicative proceeding 
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in 
writing to an extension, if an agency has not issued a 
declaratory order within 60 da>6 after receipt of the 
petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied. 
IMS 
63-46b-22. Transition procedures. 
(D The procedures for agency action, agency re-
view, and judicial review contained in this chapter 
are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings 
commenced bv or before an agency on and after Janu-
ary 1, 1988/ 
(2» Statutes and rules governing agency action, 
agency review, and judicial review that are in effect 
on December 31, 1987, govern all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or 
before December 31, 1987, even if those proceedings 
are still pending before an agency or a court on Janu-
ary* 1.19&8 **? 
CHAPTER 47 
COMMISSION ON STATUS OF WOMEN 
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63-47-1. Creation — Purpose. 
There is hereby established the Governor's Com-
mission on the Status of Women The purpose of the 
commission shall be to advise and confer with the 
governor and state agencies concerning issues of im-
portance to women and families in Utah and to serve 
as a contact and co-ordinating group to analyze state 
and local programs to determine whether they ade-
quately serve women and protect the rights of men, 
women and families it73 
63-47-2. Members — Appointment — Terms — 
Vacancies. 
The commission shall consist of fifteen members to 
be appointed by the governor for terms of four years, 
except that initially eight members shall be ap-
pointed for four years, and seven members shall be 
appointed for two years Subsequent appointments 
shall be for terms of four years Vacancies shall be 
filled for the balance of the unexpired term Members 
may serve two consecutive appointments 1973 
63-47-3. Qual i f icat ions of m e m b e r s . 
Not more than eight members of the commission 
may be from one political party. Members shall be 
appointed from persons with a demonstrated record of 
leadership and involvement, and a willingness to 
make a commitment to the furtherance of the pur-
poses of the commission. The commission shall make 
recommendations to the governor concerning ap-
pointment of members. 1973 
63-47-4. E lec t ion of c h a i r m a n — Meet ings . 
Commission members shall elect a chairman, and 
may appoint such other officers from its membership 
as is deemed necessary. The commission shall meet in 
regular meetings and may meet at special meetings 
at the request of the chairman or the governor. 1973 
63-47-5. Dut ies . 
The commission shall take action to carry out the 
following duties: 
(a) Confer with and advise the governor and 
heads of various state departments regarding 
discriminatory legislation and practices, and the 
planning of programs of particular concern to 
women. 
(b) Serve as a clearinghouse for co-ordination 
and evaluation of programs, services and legisla-
tion affecting women. 
(c) Receive and refer complaints concerning al-
leged violation of women's rights and responsibil-
ities and if necessary report such action to the 
governor. 
(d) Conduct studies, workshops, or fact-finding 
hearings to develop recommendations for con-
structive action in all areas of interest to women. 
(e) Conduct or participate in educational pro-
grams concerning issues of importance to women 
and families 
(f) Encourage community organizations and 
state and local units of government to institute 
activities designed to meet women's needs. 
(g) Participate in gaining support of changes 
deemed necessary through the development of 
legislation and community education. 
(h) Establish a liaison between the governor 
and national advisory organizations on the sta-
tus of women, and represent the governor and 
the state at meetings of such national organiza-
tions. 1973 
63-47-6. Administrative assistant — Appoint-
ment of personnel. 
The commission aha)) appoint a qualified adminis-
trative assistant to facilitate the efficient perfor-
mance of the duties prescribed by this act. That per-
son may appoint such other personnel as the commis-
sion determines to be necessary. ,f7S 
63-47-7. Authority to accept funds, gifts, and 
donations. 
The commission may receive and accept federal 
funds, private gifts, donations or funds from any 
source All moneys shall be deposited with the state 
and shall be continuously available to the comnu*' 
sion to carry out the purposes of this act ,f7S 
63-47-8. E n a c t m e n t of b y l a w s and rules. 
The commission may enact bylaws or other rule* 
for its own governance. 
